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INTRODUCTION 
“I [was] . . . the equal of the gods, save only [t]hat I must die.” 
–Euripides1 
Federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”) understand 
Euripides’s irony all too well.2 They, along with Article I judges, are 
the demigods of federal adjudication. As both courts and ALJs have 
noted, the function of ALJs closely parallels that of Article III judges.3 
 
 1.  EURIPIDES, HECUBA 33 (tran. line 341–44) (John Harrison ed. & trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2008) (quoting Princess Polyxena’s speech, delivered before she is sacrificed). 
 2.  ALJs have successfully lobbied for more prestigious titles, evolving from mere 
“examiners,” to “hearing examiners,” to “administrative law judges.” Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal 
Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 n.8 
(1981); see also K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 
HOW. L.J. 95, 123 (1995): 
Naturally, the ALJs would like to think of themselves as judges or the functional 
equivalent of federal judges. In 1972, they persuaded the Civil Service Commission 
(now the OPM) to change their title from ‘hearing examiner’ to ‘administrative law 
judge’ for the purpose of enhancing their public image and prestige.  
Yet, they are commonly referred to as ALJs, a designation that arguably diminishes their 
judicial status. They are not amused. See Lubbers, supra, at 109 n.1 (citing the August 1979 
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference newsletter); see also James P. Timony, 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
807, 814–15 (1984) (relaying how Third Circuit Judge Aldisert “noted” and dismissed “the past 
prejudice of some Article III federal judges, scholarly critics and attorneys who believe[d] that 
administrative law judges were second-class judges (if judges at all)” (citing NLRB v. Permanent 
Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J., concurring))). Like Professor 
Lubbers, I use the ubiquitous acronym only for brevity.  
 3.  See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978): 
[P]roceedings [before an ALJ] are adversary in nature. . . . They are conducted before 
a trier of fact insulated from political influence. . . . A party is entitled to present his 
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ALJs hear evidence, decide factual issues, and apply legal principles 
in all formal administrative adjudications under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).4 Indeed, they outnumber Article III judges5 
and decide more than two hundred and fifty thousand cases each 
year.6 But they lack the defining characteristics of Article III deities. 
Article III judges are installed under the Appointments Clause,7 enjoy 
tenure and salary protection during times of “good Behavior,”8 and are 
not generally subject to reversal by the executive branch.9 In contrast, 
ALJs are hired as mere employees by executive officials, receive more 
limited salary protection than Article III judges, and are subject to 
removal within the executive branch.10 Moreover, the agencies for 
which ALJs work—often themselves parties to the proceedings—can 
reverse ALJs’ decisions in toto.11 In Euripidean parlance, ALJs are 
equal to Article III judges, except for the Article III part. 
 
 
case by oral or documentary evidence . . . and the transcript of testimony and exhibits 
together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision.  
(citations omitted); Robin J. Artz et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of 
the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States, 29 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 95 (2009) (“ALJs are the functional equivalent of federal trial 
judges.”). 
 4.  5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54, 556–57 (2006) (detailing requirements for formal administrative 
rulemaking and adjudication). Although ALJs can also preside in formal rulemaking 
proceedings, id. §§ 553(c), 556–57, formal rulemaking is extremely rare, see Edward Rubin, It’s 
Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 
(2003) (“Because the impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely 
requires this technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the rare 
cases where the statute seems to do so.”). This Article concerns only ALJs’ duties in formal 
adjudications. 
 5.  Compare Judges and Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (listing 874 total 
Article III judgeships), with Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate 
administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”). 
 6.  See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1341, 1346 n.18 (1992) (stating that ALJs decided more than two hundred and fifty 
thousand social security cases in 1990).  
 7.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 9.  Federal agencies can reverse judicial statutory interpretations under certain 
circumstances. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
983–84 (2005) (permitting agencies to provide authoritative interpretations of ambiguous 
statutory language even after a contrary judicial interpretation). 
 10.  See generally infra Part I. 
 11.  See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (“On appeal from or review of the [ALJ’s] initial decision, 
the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may 
limit the issues on notice or by rule.”). 
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The Structural Quandary 
 
These differences between ALJs and Article III judges do more 
than chisel a chip on ALJs’ shoulders. They reveal material practical 
and constitutional tensions, if not constitutional violations, that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recently revitalized. These tensions concern 
ALJs’ appointments, the President’s supervisory powers over ALJs, 
and ALJs’ independence and impartiality. These three concerns are in 
tension, rendering their resolution difficult. 
First. If, as five current Supreme Court Justices have now 
suggested,12 ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), the 
manner in which some are currently selected is likely 
unconstitutional.13 The Appointments Clause in Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution requires that such officers be appointed in one of four 
ways: by (1) the President with the Senate’s consent, (2) the President 
alone, (3) the courts of law, or (4) heads of departments.14 ALJs, 
however, are selected by heads of agencies, only some of whom qualify 
as heads of departments. 
Second. ALJs’ job (or tenure) protections may improperly limit 
the President’s implied power to remove and supervise executive-
branch officers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.15 The 
agencies that select ALJs can remove them only for “good cause” and 
only with the consent of an independent federal agency, the Merit 
Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), whose members the President 
can remove only for enumerated reasons. A recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, invalidated the use of 
“tiered” tenure protection (i.e., two layers of tenure protection between 
the President and the officer at issue) for inferior officers.16 The four 
 
 12.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.) (asking whether the majority’s 
holding that dual for-cause insulation is unconstitutional would affect ALJs, who might be 
considered “Officers”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (“[ALJs] are all 
executive officers.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 13.  See infra Part II.A. 
 14.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 15.  See infra Part II.B.  
 16.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Act before us 
imposes a new type of restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who 
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dissenting Justices in that decision noted that ALJs’ two tiers of 
tenure protection (one for ALJs and one for the MSPB) would also 
appear to limit the President’s supervisory power improperly.17 In 
short, the Court’s most recent foray into this area suggests that the 
removal regime for ALJs clashes with the President’s executive 
authority.18 
Third. At the same time, increasing presidential control over 
ALJs would create impartiality concerns under the Due Process 
Clause. Agencies are parties to proceedings before the same ALJs that 
they appoint and that they may remove for good cause (albeit subject 
to the MSPB’s consent).19 If ALJs lose one of their two tiers of tenure 
protection, either (1) agencies will be able to remove ALJs at will (and 
thus render the MSPB’s extant tenure protection and role 
meaningless) or (2) agencies will be able to remove ALJs for cause 
with the consent of the MSPB, whose members the President can 
remove at will. The Supreme Court has strongly indicated that, 
despite some contrary scholarly opinions, the current ALJ model is 
sufficient under the Due Process Clause. But its recent decision 
concerning recusal of elected state-court judges, Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co.,20 casts doubt on this view. The agencies’ ability to 
appoint ALJs and initiate their removal creates obvious incentives for 
ALJs to favor agency positions. Regardless of whether this partiality 
problem assumes an unconstitutional dimension, the current 
structure raises problems for ALJs, agencies, parties that appear 
before ALJs, and society as a whole. 
Existing proposals to reform the ALJ system fail to identify, 
much less solve, these competing concerns.21 For instance, simply 
permitting a department head (perhaps of a new independent agency) 
to appoint ALJs would resolve the appointment issue, but not fully 
address due process or presidential-supervision concerns. Likewise, 
providing ALJs increased tenure protection may resolve lingering 
independence concerns, but leave the President with insufficient 
supervisory power over ALJs, while not addressing the appointment 
issue at all. Conversely, reducing ALJ tenure protection may resolve 
 
nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority 
in this way.”). 
 17.  See id. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Does every losing party before an ALJ now 
have grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered against him is unconstitutional?”). 
 18.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 19.  See infra Part II.C. 
 20.  556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 21.  See infra Part III. 
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presidential-supervision concerns, but damage ALJ independence and, 
once again, fail to address Appointments Clause concerns. 
 
 
 
The Solution 
 
My proposed remedy is to permit the D.C. Circuit to appoint, 
discipline, and remove ALJs upon request from administrative 
agencies.22 Permitting a “Court[] of Law” to appoint ALJs, who are at 
most “inferior Officers” within the executive branch, comports with 
the text of the Appointments Clause and Supreme Court case law.23 
To be sure, the Court has prohibited Congress from creating 
“incongruous” interbranch appointments.24 Although the Court’s 
existing approach to incongruity is murky, I extract from it a three-
part inquiry that unifies the incongruity principle with the separation-
of-powers constraints that the Court has erected in this field. In short, 
courts should deem an interbranch appointment appropriate when 
(1) Congress has a significant justification for turning to its 
interbranch-appointment power, (2) the power to appoint (and an 
incidental power to remove) does not impede the appointing branch’s 
central functioning under the U.S. Constitution, and (3) the lack of 
appointment (and removal) power does not, likewise, impede the 
competing branch’s central functioning. 
The D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs satisfies these three 
criteria. First, it is significantly justified because it resolves the three 
constitutional concerns. It does so by properly placing the 
appointment power in a “court of law”; ending “tiered” removal 
protection within the executive branch for ALJs by appropriately 
giving the D.C. Circuit the power to remove ALJs, as consistent with 
existing interbranch-appointment doctrine and even the underlying 
rationale of Free Enterprise Fund; and limiting the executive branch’s 
role in appointing and removing the adjudicators for formal 
proceedings to which executive agencies are often parties. Second, the 
 
 22.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the Courts of Law . . . .”). 
 24.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675 (1988): 
We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to provide for interbranch appointments 
of ‘inferior officers’ is unlimited. In addition to separation of powers concerns . . . 
Congress’ decision to vest the appointment power in the courts would be improper if 
there was some ‘incongruity’ between the functions normally performed by the courts 
and the performance of their duty to appoint. 
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interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of 
the D.C. Circuit. As the court that hears numerous administrative law 
cases and has the lowest judge-to-merits-decisions ratio among the 
circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit has the expertise and time to appoint 
and remove other adjudicators. Indeed, Article III courts currently 
perform the interbranch appointment and removal of Article I 
bankruptcy judges, as well as the intrabranch appointment and 
removal of magistrate judges and special masters. Third, the 
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of 
the executive branch. The executive branch may still formulate all 
administrative policy that arises from formal adjudication by 
continuing to reverse ALJ decisions in toto under the APA. 
Ultimately, this Article seeks to do three things. It seeks to 
identify the three competing concerns surrounding ALJs, suggest a 
workable statutory solution to a major problem in administrative law 
that recent Supreme Court decisions have brought into focus, and 
clarify the nature and benefits of Congress’s interbranch-appointment 
power for the federal administrative state. To those ends, Part I 
provides a brief synopsis of current ALJ hiring, removal, and 
independence protections. Part II considers the constitutional 
questions surrounding ALJs’ selection, removal, and independence to 
bring the tripartite quandary into clear view. Part III considers the 
limitations on prior solutions and scholarship in light of the quandary, 
most of which focus only on ALJ independence. And finally, Part IV 
provides a refined manner of analyzing the propriety of interbranch 
appointments and argues that an interbranch appointment of ALJs 
resolves the quandary. Even with a permissible interbranch 
appointment, ALJs certainly won’t be gods. But a limited ALJ 
apotheosis, brought about by an interbranch appointment, should 
mitigate concerns that surround ALJs’ place within our government of 
separated powers. 
I. ALJS’ CURRENT SELECTION, REMOVAL, AND PROTECTIONS 
A brief exposition of the current manner of ALJ selection, 
removal, and independence permits a better understanding of the 
theoretical and doctrinal concerns mentioned above. An interbranch-
appointment remedy, as explained later, can adopt much of the 
current ALJ appointment and removal structure by reallocating 
various powers to effect the desired structural improvement. 
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A. Current ALJ Selection 
The appointment of ALJs, unlike that of Article III judges, does 
not require the President’s nomination and the Senate’s 
confirmation.25 Instead, each federal agency selects ALJs “as are 
necessary” for the agency to conduct formal adjudicatory 
proceedings.26 The President is not directly, if at all, involved in the 
selection of ALJs, and the Senate does not serve as a check on the 
agency’s choice. 
But agencies do not have carte blanche when selecting ALJs. 
Instead, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) creates and 
administers standards for ALJ selection for the approximately sixteen 
hundred federal ALJs.27 Candidates must be licensed attorneys with 
at least seven years’ experience and pass an examination that tests 
their ability to draft a decision and analyze relevant legal issues.28 
Military veterans receive five to ten preference points.29 Based on 
their experiences, examination scores, and veteran statuses, the 
highest-scoring candidates are placed on a list.30 Agencies, under what 
 
 25.  See Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 
(SUPP.) 523, 532–33 (1990) (contrasting the Article III appointment process with ALJ selection).  
 26.  5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006). 
 27.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to 
adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”); Levinson, supra note 25, at 533.  
 28.  VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010); Jesse Etelson, The New ALJ Examination: A Bright, Shining 
Lie Redux, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 185, 191–93 (1991) (explaining and critiquing the ALJ written 
examination that requires candidates to draft a hypothetical opinion). 
 29.  Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3309; 5 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2012). The OPM’s scoring 
formulation for veterans led to protracted litigation and even temporary suspension of hiring 
ALJs from 1999 to 2003. BURROWS, supra note 28, at 3:  
The litigation arose out of changes that OPM made in 1996 to the scoring formula 
that is used to rate and rank potential ALJs. These changes . . . resulted in a scoring 
system that . . . [gave] veterans a significant hiring advantage over non-veterans. As a 
consequence, non-veteran applicants for ALJ positions sued, claiming that the new 
scoring formula was unlawful.  
See also Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 319 F.3d 1368, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing the 
litigation’s journey to the Federal Circuit). ALJs and agencies have criticized the veterans’ 
preference because an additional ten points based on veteran status can have a significant effect 
on the final list of candidates, whose scores range from eighty to one hundred points. See 
Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–16 (“Since there is only a 20-point spread on scores among all ALJ 
eligibles (from 80 to 100), the addition of 5 to 10 veterans preference points to any score can 
change by many places an eligible’s ranking on the register.”).  
 30.  See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2 (“Applicants who meet the[ ] minimum qualification 
standards and pass the examination are then assigned a score and placed on a register of eligible 
hires.”). 
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is known as the “Rule of Three,”31 may then select from the three 
highest-ranking candidates.32 
Agencies, perhaps unsurprisingly, have sought to avoid the 
Rule of Three. They have instead sought “selective certification.”33 
Selective certification permits an agency, “upon a showing of necessity 
and with the prior approval of OPM, . . . to appoint specially certified 
eligibles without regard to their ranking in relation to other 
eligibles . . . who lack the special certification.”34 Numerous agencies 
routinely engaged in selective certification from the 1960s until the 
early 1980s, generally justified by needing ALJs with technical 
knowledge and experience.35 Yet after substantial criticism that 
selective certification allowed agencies to hire ALJs with a more “pro-
enforcement attitude,”36 the OPM ended selective certification in 
1984.37 Much to ALJs’ alarm,38 certain agencies have recently sought 
to obtain waivers from the OPM to engage in selective certification 
once again39 and even appealed to Congress for legislative 
dispensation from the OPM’s refusal.40 
 
 31.  Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101. 
 32.  See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2–3 (“Agencies then select an ALJ from the top three 
available candidates, taking into account the location of the position, the geographical preference 
of the candidate, and veterans’ preference rules.”).  
 33.  Lubbers, supra note 2, at 117. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101; see also BURROWS, supra note 28, at 5–6 
(overviewing the history of selective certification from before the APA’s enactment through the 
1980s). 
 36.  Lubbers, supra note 2, at 118. 
 37.  See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (“In 1984, OPM ended the selective certification 
procedure in Examination Announcement No. 318. Agencies were no longer allowed to formally 
require subject-matter expertise.”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 332.404 (2012) (requiring agency to select 
from the “highest three eligibles”). 
 38.  See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 98, 101–02 (“We urge [the President-Elect] to appoint 
agency heads who will respect, uphold, and enforce the provisions of the APA regarding the 
federal agency administrative adjudication process. In recent years, agency heads have been 
making legislative efforts to erode . . . the APA provisions that ensure the independence of ALJ 
decision-making.”). 
 39.  See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that the International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”) and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) have sought selective-certification 
powers).  
 40.  Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101–02 (noting that the ITC and the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) both sought legislation to permit them to evade the OPM’s refusal to permit 
selective certification). But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS-
ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8–10 (2010) 
[hereinafter GAO-10-14] (reporting that the SSA and Health and Human Services officials were 
pleased with the quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought changes—such as by awarding 
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Despite the OPM’s rejection of selective certification, ALJs are 
dissatisfied with the OPM. In a 2008 report to President-elect Obama, 
the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference argued that the 
OPM should be divested of its authority to appoint and review ALJs.41 
The ALJs complained that the OPM eliminated the office that selected 
ALJs (by assigning that office’s duties to other offices within the 
OPM), eliminated the requirement for ALJ candidates to have 
litigation experience,42 altered the ALJ-exam schedule in a manner 
that rendered it “difficult for private sector attorneys to apply,”43 and 
sought to reward ALJs based on an agency’s political goals.44 
Ultimately, the ALJs reported that “the OPM . . . has sought to 
undermine ALJs[’] independence and downgrade ALJs’ level of 
experience and competence.”45 Partially in response to ALJs’ concerns, 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has recently 
recommended certain changes to Congress concerning ALJ hiring and 
supervision.46 
B. Current ALJ Tenure Protections and Independence 
Once selected, ALJs have certain protections from political 
forces but limited independence in making final decisions. The APA 
provides for a separation of functions between ALJs and certain 
agency employees. ALJs may not perform investigative or 
prosecutorial functions or report to an employee who does, or have ex 
parte contacts concerning a fact at issue.47 But heads of agencies can 
 
bonus points to eligible candidates—to ensure that the appointment considered “specialized 
knowledge”). 
 41.  See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106 (“[W]e advocate the creation of a new independent 
agency . . . which would be responsible for the functions that the OPM has been performing, or 
should have been performing . . . .”). 
 42.  Id. at 105–06. 
 43.  Id. at 106. 
 44.  See id. at 105 (“[T]he OPM has taken the position that ALJs are no different from other 
federal employees and should be covered by a ‘pay for performance’ system that measures 
performance by agency (i.e., political) goals. If implemented, OPM’s position would result in 
inappropriate agency influence over the functions performed by ALJs . . . .”). 
 45.  Id. at 106. 
 46.  See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 26–28 (suggesting, among other things, that ALJs 
become more involved in hiring and personnel-management decisions). 
 47.  5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)–(2) (2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ may remain responsible to the 
head of the agency, although the head of the agency also oversees investigations and 
prosecutions. See id. § 554(d)(2)(C); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 346 (1991) (describing separation of powers for ALJs). 
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still set agency policy and supervise ALJs.48 They have the authority 
to reverse ALJs’ decisions in full, as to both fact and law.49 Agencies, 
however, must provide some deference to ALJs’ witness-demeanor 
observations50 and consider the ALJs’ initial decision during 
administrative appeal.51 
If unsatisfied with their power to reverse ALJ decisions, 
agencies have a circumscribed ability to discipline and remove ALJs. 
Agencies may remove and generally discipline ALJs only for “good 
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board” after a formal administrative hearing.52 The MSPB members, 
like ALJs, also enjoy tenure protection because the President can 
remove them “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.”53 Otherwise, ALJs essentially have life tenure because they do 
not serve for a period of years in office.54 
ALJs’ effective life tenure, however, loses some of its sheen 
because of the ambiguity of the good cause standard that governs 
MSPB proceedings.55 That standard has permitted removal for, among 
other things, being absent for extended periods, declining to set 
hearing dates, and having a “high rate of significant adjudicatory 
errors.”56 Moreover, the MSPB has indicated that insubordination can 
constitute cause, although the Board left unclear how specific the 
 
 48.  5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C) (exempting the “agency or a member or members of the body 
comprising the agency” from the separation-of-functions requirement). 
 49.  See id. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the 
powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on 
notice or by rule.”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494–95 (1951) (explaining 
that the APA permits agencies to decline adopting an ALJ’s recommendations). 
 50.  Timony, supra note 2, at 811 (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496; E. Eng’g & 
Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 51.  Id. at 811–12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1982)). 
 52.  5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). 
 53.  Id. § 1202(d). 
 54.  See Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1344. Professor Verkuil argues that ALJs have more 
secure tenure than bankruptcy and magistrate judges because ALJs are not appointed to terms 
of office. See id. Although ALJs do not have to worry about an essentially standardless judicial 
reappointment, cf. Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments 
Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 248 (2008) (“During 1998 to 2002, circuit courts 
reappointed over 90% of those bankruptcy judges applying for reappointment.”), they can be 
removed under what appears to be a more liberal tenure-protection provision by another 
executive entity. See infra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
 55.  Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 325 (1984); Harold J. Krent & Lindsay 
DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the 
Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 34 (2005) (“[T]he meaning of 
‘cause’ is unclear . . . .”). 
 56.  BURROWS, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 
172 (Michael Asimov ed., 2003)).  
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agency’s instructions and how overwhelming the agency’s evidence of 
insubordination must be.57 
In light of the uncertain governing removal standard, perhaps 
it is not surprising that more removal proceedings have been brought 
against ALJs than against Article III judges. Article III judges retain 
their appointments “during good Behavior”—a more demanding 
standard than good cause—and are removed only after the 
cumbersome interbranch-collaborative process of impeachment.58 Only 
fifteen Article III judges have been impeached in more than two 
hundred years.59 In contrast, agencies have brought more than twenty 
actions against ALJs from 1946 to 1992.60 ALJs have noted these 
removal attempts—especially the fifteen of which occurred over a six-
year period in the 1970s and 1980s61—and the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s recent legislative proposal to 
obtain authority to “discipline” ALJs for undefined “offenses” without 
prior findings by the MSPB.62 
 
 57.  Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 326, 331; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control 
Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 506 (1990) (criticizing MSPB’s insubordination dicta and its “abysmal 
ignorance of statistics” in appearing to reject the Agency’s productivity argument). The MSPB, 
earlier in its opinion, stated, “If the agency is basing its charge on reasons which constitute an 
improper interference with the performance by an ALJ of his or her judicial functions, the charge 
cannot constitute good cause.” Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 328. 
 58.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 326 (citing 
McEachern v. Macy, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965)) (holding that good cause standard has been 
more broadly interpreted than good-behavior standard); Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017 
(Ct. Cl. 1973); and Chocallo v. Prokop, C.A. No. 80–1053 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1980), aff’d mem., 673 
F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 59. Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home. 
nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited May 16, 2011). Three of the impeached judges 
resigned before the Senate’s impeachment trials concluded. See id. 
 60.  BURROWS, supra note 28, at 9; James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s 
Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1222 n.150 (2006) (citing Morell E. Mullins, 
Manual for Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES i, 116 (2004)). 
Social Security Commissioner Michael Astrue stated that fifty-eight ALJs have been disciplined 
since 2007, mostly for deciding too few cases. See David Ingram, Social Security’s Disability 
Judges Come Under Scrutiny, THE BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (July 11, 2011, 5:14 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/social-securitys-disability-judges-come-under-
scrutiny.html. But one ALJ was placed on administrative leave based on his high approval of 
disability benefits. See id.  
 61.  Bruff, supra note 47, at 348 (noting, in 1991, the “recent, sharp upturn in the frequency 
of [ALJ] removal attempts”); Timony, supra note 2, at 807 & n.2 (listing cases). 
 62.  Artz et al., supra note 3, at 103–04. 
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II. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOMFORT 
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions either create or 
reenergize three significant issues surrounding ALJs’ current 
selection and removal. First, does the method of ALJs’ selection violate 
the Appointments Clause? Second, do ALJs’ tenure protections 
improperly impede the President’s supervisory powers? Finally, do 
ALJs’ current tenure protections (or reduced protections, if required 
under Article II) create due process and fairness concerns? Scholars 
have typically limited themselves to addressing the appropriate 
balance between ALJ independence and subordination, but without 
considering the three separation-of-powers concerns that have come 
into sharper relief recently. Once the reader considers the competing 
concerns below, the limitations of previously proposed solutions and 
scholarship become apparent. 
A. Improper Appointments? 
The Appointments Clause governs the appointment of all 
“Officers of the United States.”63 Federal “[o]fficers” are those who 
“exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States.”64 They fall into two categories—principal and inferior 
officers.65 Principal officers, most likely those who report directly to 
the President, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate.66 But the so-called “Excepting Clause”67 to the 
Appointments Clause gives Congress flexibility in the appointing of 
inferior officers,68 that is, “officers whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential 
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate”69 or officers of 
lesser importance as measured by some function of their duties, 
tenure, and supervision.70 Inferior officers may be appointed in one of 
 
 63.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878). 
 64.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). 
 65.  Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509 (“The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly 
divides all its officers into two classes [viz., ‘primary’ and ‘inferior’ officers].”) (quoted in Weiss v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 183 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to officers as “principal 
and inferior officers”)). 
 66.  Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). 
 67.  Id. at 660 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627–28 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911)). 
 68.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 69.  Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. 
 70.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988). 
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the following four ways, as Congress “think[s] proper”: in the same 
manner as principal officers, by the President alone, by a Court of 
Law, or by the Head of a Department.71 The Appointments Clause 
does not apply to those who are “mere employees.”72 A preliminary 
issue surrounding ALJs is whether they are inferior officers or mere 
employees. 
If they are inferior officers, many ALJs’ appointments are 
likely improper. Although the Excepting Clause permits Congress to 
bestow the appointment power of inferior officers on department 
heads, Congress has not done so for all ALJs. Instead, Congress, 
through the APA, permits “[e]ach agency” to select its ALJs “as are 
necessary.”73 Departments and agencies, despite their similarity, are 
not identical. An “agency” is a statutory term that refers to “each 
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is 
within or subject to review by another agency,” save for a few 
enumerated exceptions.74 But a “department” is a constitutional 
animal that refers to a “freestanding component of the Executive 
Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such 
component”75 with a “distinct province, in which a class of duties are 
[sic] allotted.”76 Because an agency need not have the two key 
characteristics of a department (independence and self-containment 
from other administrative entities), not all agencies that appoint ALJs 
are departments. Those ALJs selected by a nondepartment “agency” 
are not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.77 
 
 71.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 72.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Auffmordt v. 
Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)). 
 73.  5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006). 
 74.  Id. § 551(1). 
 75.  Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010). 
 76.  Id. at 3162 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, Department Definition, in AMERICAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. reprint 1995) (1828) (def. 2)). 
 77.  For each ALJ appointment, one must know which entity is appointing and whether 
that entity is a department. Justice Breyer prepared a list of agencies that employ ALJs in his 
dissent in Free Enterprise Fund. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3214 app. C (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Most federal ALJs work for the SSA, see id., which is likely a department because it 
is independent and self-contained. See 42 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006). But several of the other listed 
agencies—including the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, among others—may not qualify as 
departments. See Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Appointment with 
Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s definition of “department” does 
not clarify whether independence and self-containment are both necessary, or individually 
sufficient, characteristics for departmental status); see also Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
the FDIC abandoned its argument that the Office of Thrift Supervision, which selected ALJs, 
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But for the method of selection to acquire constitutional import, 
ALJs must be officers, not mere employees. To determine ALJs’ 
status, one must decide whether ALJs “exercis[e] significant authority 
pursuant to the laws of the United States”78 or serve as “lesser 
functionaries”79—an inquiry reminiscent of distinguishing High 
Baroque from Rococo.80 Yet, the determination is important because a 
“defect in [an ALJ’s] appointment [is] an irregularity which would 
invalidate a resulting order.”81 
ALJs appear to exercise significant authority under federal 
law. Their positions are established by law.82 ALJs provide initial 
decisions that establish factual findings and apply agency regulations 
and policy.83 ALJs have significant discretion to oversee discovery, 
issue subpoenas, and sanction parties in regulatory, enforcement, and 
licensing proceedings.84 A party’s violation of certain ALJ orders can 
lead to criminal penalties.85 During administrative review, the agency 
must provide some deference to the ALJ’s credibility findings and 
 
was a department). By adopting my solution in Part IV, infra, one can avoid this tedious, and 
perhaps ultimately indeterminate, inquiry into departmental status for those agencies 
appointing numerous ALJs.  
 Moreover, if various agencies are not departments, the approbation doctrine (i.e., a 
department head’s approval cures a subordinate’s otherwise unconstitutional appointment) will 
not likely salvage the otherwise unconstitutional appointments. The APA does not expressly 
permit department heads to approbate subordinate agencies’ ALJ appointments, and thus any 
approbation would lack statutory authority. See Barnett, supra, at 1481 n.161 (citing United 
States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 
393–94 (1868)).  
 78.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). 
 79.  Id. at 126 n.162 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. 
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)). 
 80.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3178–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Landry, 204 
F.3d at 1132–34. The Office of Legal Counsel has prepared a lengthy memorandum that 
addresses characteristics that distinguish employees from officers. Memorandum from Steven G. 
Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the 
General Counsels of the Executive Branch, Regarding Officers of the United States Within the 
Meaning of the Appointments Clause 3 (Apr. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007 /appointmentsclausev10.pdf. The memo concludes that an officer 
must have been delegated sovereign authority in a “continuing” fashion. See id. But the drafters 
freely concede that “the Supreme Court has not articulated the precise scope and application of 
the Clause’s requirements.” See id.  
 81.  United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952). 
 82.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133. 
 83.  See Timony, supra note 2, at 812. 
 84.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (comparing similar duties to special trial judges within the 
U.S. Tax Court, whom the Supreme Court in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991), 
held were inferior officers); Timony, supra note 2, at 812–13. 
 85.  See Timony, supra note 2, at 813. 
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consider the ALJ’s decision.86 Within some agencies, these findings are 
generally final.87 
In light of others whom the Supreme Court has deemed inferior 
officers, ALJs’ authority seems more than sufficient to provide similar 
status. The Court has held that district-court clerks, thousands of 
clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an assistant 
surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal marshals, 
military judges, Article I judges, and the general counsel for the 
Transportation Department are inferior officers.88 Perhaps, then, it is 
not surprising that five current Justices have suggested that ALJs 
also rise to this level.89 
But Congress and the D.C. Circuit (the last court to have its 
say on the issue) may think otherwise. Congress referred to ALJs in 
the APA as “presiding employee[s],”90 although this reference might be 
understood as a lingering indignity from the ALJs’ “hearing examiner” 
past.91 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit held in Landry v. FDIC that ALJs 
appointed by the Office of Thrift Supervision were employees, despite 
their significant authority, because they have no statutory authority 
to issue final opinions.92 The majority concluded that the Court in 
Freytag v. Commissioner held that special trial judges for the U.S. Tax 
Court (“STJs”) were inferior officers only because they had the power 
to issue final decisions.93 The majority acknowledged that the Freytag 
Court stated that it would not have altered its conclusion even if the 
STJs’ nonfinal decisionmaking powers were less significant.94 But the 
Landry majority held that the Freytag Court would not have then 
mentioned the STJs’ final decisionmaking powers (which were not 
 
 86.  See id. at 811–12. 
 87.  See id. at 812. 
 88.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
cases). 
 89.  See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by three other justices); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 920 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined by Kennedy, J.). But see 
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10 (majority opinion joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.) 
(suggesting, in dicta, that ALJs may be employees). 
 90.  5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also id. § 554(d) (referring to ALJs as “[t]he employee who 
presides”). But see id. § 556(b)(3) (referring to ALJs as “administrative law judges”). 
 91.  See supra note 2. 
 92.  Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Antonin Scalia, The ALJ 
Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 (1979) (describing ALJs’ inability to issue final 
decisions).  
 93.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134. 
 94.  Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882). 
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employed in the Freytag case) unless those powers were “critical to the 
Court’s decision.”95 
Judge Randolph dissented in Landry and had the better 
argument. As he demonstrated, the Freytag Court’s discussion of the 
STJs’ finality power was part of an alternative holding,96 provided 
after the Court had announced its conclusion that “a special trial 
judge is an inferior Office[r] whose appointment must conform to the 
Appointments Clause.”97 The authority to issue final decisions thus 
was not a necessary criterion. Indeed, federal magistrate judges, like 
ALJs, provide only initial decisions that a district court may review de 
novo, and they have long been deemed “inferior Officers” subject to 
appointment by “Courts of Law.”98 Moreover, had ALJs the power to 
issue final decisions, they well could be transformed into principal 
officers, whose “work [would not be] directed and supervised at some 
level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with 
the advice and consent of the Senate.”99 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Edmond v. United States held that the judges of the Coast Guard 
Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior, not principal, officers because 
they “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United 
States unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers.”100 The 
agencies’ power to overrule, in other words, merely establishes ALJs’ 
status as inferior officers. 
Aside from this substantial constitutional concern, the ALJ-
selection process is less than satisfactory to ALJs, agencies, and those 
affected by agency adjudication. ALJs have complained about the 
OPM’s lack of interest in the selection process and recently revised 
selection criteria,101 and scholars have complained about the 
 
 95.  Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882). 
 96.  Id. at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 97.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. 
 98.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–54 (1931); Rice v. 
Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 
537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). But see Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: 
Identifying Which Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. 
REV. 1143, 1178–80 (2011) (arguing that a government worker should be deemed to have 
“significant authority” (as required for status as an “officer”) only if that worker’s actions are 
“final,” as that term is understood under the APA). 
 99.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).  
 100.  Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665. 
 101.  See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–06. 
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overbearing impact of the veterans’ preference.102 The agencies, too, 
have felt constrained by the Rule of Three and have sought a greater 
role in selecting ALJs with expertise in the agencies’ subject 
matters.103 Accordingly, even if current ALJ selection does not violate 
the Appointments Clause, key actors in the selection process—
particularly ALJs and the agencies—are dissatisfied with the current 
regime. 
B. Improperly Impeding Presidential Supervision? 
ALJs’ tenure protection also presents a substantial 
constitutional question after Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.104 The 
Court’s 5-4 decision in that case invalidated Congress’s use of two 
layers of tenure protection to shield Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) members from the President’s removal.105 
The SEC could appoint and remove PCAOB members.106 One (implied) 
tenure-protection provision protected members of the SEC from the 
President’s at-will removal,107 and a second (statutory) tenure-
protection provision protected PCAOB members from the SEC’s at-will 
removal.108 The Court invalidated this scheme because the two tiers of 
tenure protection together unconstitutionally impinged the President’s 
supervisory power by preventing him from holding the SEC 
responsible for PCAOB’s actions in the same manner as he could hold 
the SEC accountable for its other responsibilities.109 
As Justice Breyer argued in his dissent, Free Enterprise Fund 
suggests that ALJs’ tenure protections are also in jeopardy.110 Like 
PCAOB members, two tiers of tenure protection shield ALJs from the 
President’s control. As for the first tier, ALJs may be removed only for 
good cause,111 meaning that “[ALJs] [a]re not to be . . . discharged at 
the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons.”112 That good 
 
 102.  See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–16 (describing how a ten-point increase for 
certain veterans (1) substantially impacts eligible candidates’ ordering because the scores have 
only a twenty-point range and (2) limits the number of women candidates). 
 103.  See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 104.  Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 105.  Id. at 3147. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 3148–49. 
 108.  Id. at 3148. 
 109.  Id. at 3154. 
 110.  Id. at 3180–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 111.  5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006). 
 112.  Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953). 
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cause must be established by the MSPB,113 whose members are 
shielded from the President’s at-will removal by a second tier of tenure 
protection.114 (Indeed, a third tier of tenure protection may exist if the 
agency, such as the SEC, that may seek removal is independent and 
has its own tenure protection.115) Justice Breyer argued that the 
majority’s decision suggested that “every losing party before an ALJ 
now ha[s] grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered 
against him is unconstitutional.”116 The majority responded that its 
“holding does not address . . . [ALJs],” while suggesting that ALJs may 
be permitted additional protections based on their ambiguous 
officer/employee status or their adjudicative, as opposed to 
policymaking, functions.117  
The majority’s proposed distinctions118 are unsound as stated, 
devaluing the dicta for lower courts and rendering Justice Breyer’s 
premonition all the more foreboding. First, the majority suggests, 
without explanation, that Congress may limit the President’s 
supervisory power over employees to a greater degree than officers.119 
That the President needs supervisory control over policymakers, 
however, does not mean that he should have less, as opposed to equal, 
control over those who perform mostly ministerial, yet often still 
discretionary and important, tasks. The President should be able to 
oversee all people who implement executive policy because doing so is 
necessary for the President to take care that the law is faithfully 
executed.120 After all, it would be odd, at the very least, if the 
 
 113.  5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). 
 114.  Id. § 1202(d). 
 115.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies 
. . . whose heads are not removable at will.”), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).  
 116.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
holding does not specifically address this issue). 
 117.  Id. at 3160 n.10 (majority opinion). I previously suggested another manner of limiting 
the majority’s opinion to prevent the invalidation of ALJs’ tenure protections. See Kent Barnett, 
Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1397–99 (2012) 
(arguing that the particular combination of tenure protections for ALJs does not impermissibly 
interfere with the President’s supervisory power). 
 118.  Despite the majority’s eschewal or rejection of functionalism in Free Enterprise Fund’s 
discussion of the President’s removal power, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative 
Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund 
and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 
61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012); infra note 191 and accompanying text, these distinctions 
concerning ALJs are conspicuously functional. 
 119.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10. 
 120.  Compare generally id. (invalidating tenure protection for inferior officers whom a 
department head of an independent agency appointed), with Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 
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President were to have more control over cabinet members confirmed 
by the Senate than the President’s own administrative assistants. 
Second, the President does not necessarily need less 
supervisory authority over ALJs merely because they engage in 
adjudication.121 After all, “agencies use adjudication to form policy.”122 
Indeed, certain agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”), create policy primarily through adjudication, not 
rulemaking.123 Moreover, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, 
the PCAOB members, like ALJs, also exercised adjudicatory powers 
provided by statute, but the majority invalidated their tenure 
protection anyway without mentioning those powers.124 Nevertheless, 
as discussed in Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.3 of this Article, ALJs’ sole 
adjudicatory function—in formal proceedings—should permit 
Congress to limit the President’s supervisory power over ALJs without 
undermining the majority’s decision.125 
Ultimately, like the selection methods for ALJs, ALJs’ tiered-
tenure-protection provisions may or may not prove to be 
constitutional. But at the very least, the Court has flagged a serious 
issue concerning ALJs’ potentially excessive tenure protection. And 
this question, like the appointments question, can be resolved without 
awaiting a definitive answer from the Supreme Court. 
C. Insufficient Impartiality? 
Whether or not the Court would invalidate ALJs’ tenure 
protection, their limited independence raises impartiality, and thus 
due process, concerns. Scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs are 
 
173–74 (1926) (approving of Civil Service protections, despite invalidating tenure protection for 
inferior officers appointed by department heads of executive, as opposed to independent, 
agencies).  
 121.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10. 
 122.  Bruff, supra note 47, at 356; accord SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947).  
 123.  See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER 
J. PUB. L. 33, 38 n.23 (2002) (explaining how in its first fifty years of existence the NLRB made 
all its decisions through adjudication and did not promulgate a single rule). 
 124.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Although ALJs for a handful of agencies may (but rarely do) preside over formal 
rulemaking proceedings, see supra note 4, their function is nearly identical in these proceedings 
because they help prepare a formal record and, at times, provide an initial decision. See, e.g., Jim 
Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 
60 (2004). Because the function of ALJs is essentially unchanged and ALJs are essentially bound 
by the same APA requirements for both formal adjudication and rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 
557 (2006), their limited and rare ability to preside over rulemaking should not require 
additional presidential supervisory power.  
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sufficiently independent to ensure their impartiality. Some Supreme 
Court decisions, for their part, strongly suggest that ALJs’ 
independence suffices under the Due Process Clause, but their limited 
rationales are not wholly satisfying. The Court’s recent decision in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,126 however, may suggest that the 
method of ALJs’ appointment and removal provides too little 
independence. Although Caperton concerned state judicial elections, 
its reasoning and concern over impartiality applies equally, if not with 
more strength, to administrative adjudication. 
My purpose here is not to describe or critique fully the 
numerous arguments in academic literature concerning the nature 
and breadth, whether normative or descriptive, of ALJ independence. 
What follows, instead, is a brief synthesis of the arguments concerning 
ALJ impartiality, a critical review of often-invoked Supreme Court 
decisions, and an assessment of the impact that Caperton and Free 
Enterprise Fund may have on the due process issue. As with the ALJ 
appointment and presidential-supervision concerns, the purpose here 
is merely to identify the significant constitutional concern, not to 
resolve whether a constitutional violation exists. 
1. Brief Overview of the Impartiality Debate 
Due process demands impartiality and fairness.127 
Independence can further these values, but the amount of 
independence necessary will depend upon the interest at issue and the 
extent of the decisionmaker’s authority.128 Because an ALJ has a role 
in accomplishing “an agency task,” as opposed to reviewing the other 
branches’ actions, she “cannot be entirely impartial.”129 The question 
 
 126.  556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 127.  See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (outlining situations in which the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the decisionmaker is constitutionally intolerable); Henry 
J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–87 (1975) (describing the 
elements of a fair hearing); Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 9–10 (stressing the importance of 
impartial adjudications for ALJs); Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State 
Central Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 475, 479 (2001) (explaining that the hearing must be at a meaningful time in a meaningful 
manner to fulfill the fundamental due process requisite of providing “an opportunity to be 
heard”). 
 128.  See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1214 (citing Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by 
“Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 325 (2003)) (arguing that independence is also 
not “an all-or-nothing” proposition and that it is useful only to the extent that it furthers 
impartiality and separation of powers). 
 129.  Gedid, supra note 123, at 54; see also id. at 38 (“ALJs are not impartial and neutral in 
the same sense as Article III judges, but frequently have a role in developing and applying 
agency policy.”).  
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is, then, whether ALJs are sufficiently independent to ensure 
sufficient impartiality. 
Some aspects of ALJ selection and removal suggest insufficient 
independence to guarantee impartiality. The agency has the ability to 
select the ALJ candidate (from the three submitted candidates) whom 
it believes will be most sympathetic to agency positions.130 The ALJ, 
perhaps regardless of his or her background or predisposition to 
agency views, becomes inculcated with agency prerogatives and 
concerns.131 The agency often serves as a party to an administrative 
proceeding and can initiate an ALJ’s removal.132 Indeed, this 
“[r]emoval authority has always been associated with control: It is the 
sine qua non of effective supervision—the guarantee that subordinates 
will take direction.”133 This concern over the removal power becomes 
more urgent if ALJs’ tenure protections are invalidated, as Justice 
Breyer fears, because the MSPB’s review of an agency’s at-will 
removal of an ALJ would be meaningless.134 Finally, ALJs have 
indicated that agencies are perceived to interfere with ALJ decisions, 
and twenty-six percent of ALJs for the SSA have complained of 
Agency pressure to rule differently.135 An ALJ’s inculcation, 
 
 130.  But the agency’s power seems similar to the President’s in selecting Article III judges. 
The President often selects judicial candidates who are likely to share the President’s judicial or 
political philosophy. And, indeed, the Senate and the President can select candidates whom they 
perceive as favoring the federal government’s position.  
 131.  Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25; see also Bruff, supra note 47, at 352 (“[T]hose who work 
within an agency are subject to a multitude of open or subtle socializing pressures that do not 
reach a separate institution.”). 
 132.  See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 34–35 (discussing how agencies oversee the 
conduct of ALJs to ensure competence and civility, and can remove ALJs for good cause). 
 133.  Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court 
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 421 (2001) (citing Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)); accord Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 
(2010) (“The President has been given the power to oversee executive officers; he is not 
limited . . . to persuading his unelected subordinates to do what they ought to do without 
persuasion. In its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce the Chief 
Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)). 
 134.  See supra Part II.B. 
 135.  Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 
280 (1994) (discussed in Moliterno, supra note 60, at nn.94 & 108); Martin H. Redish & 
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Value of Procedural Due Process, 95 
YALE L.J. 455, 499 (1986) (“Evidence suggests that various agencies have used the possibility of 
removal as a tool for coercing decisions that are consistent with the agency’s wishes.”); see also 
Redish & Marshall, supra, at 477 (“[I]f the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the 
governmental body on the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision will be based 
on considerations other than the merits as developed by the evidence.”). 
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appointment, and limited tenure protections create, the argument 
goes, both apparent and actual bias concerns.136 
But ALJs have significant indicia of independence that support 
their impartiality. The OPM, after scoring ALJ candidates, limits 
agencies’ discretion in selecting candidates.137 The agencies can only 
initiate removal proceedings; they must convince another independent 
agency that good cause exists for the ALJ’s removal.138 This tenure 
protection appears meaningful because, despite numerous attempts, 
agencies have convinced the MSPB to remove only five ALJs as of 
2006.139 Indeed, “it is generally understood [based on statutory and 
constitutional restrictions] that presidential supervision . . . should 
steer clear of interference in adjudications, no matter who performs 
them.”140 The APA promotes this understanding by limiting the ALJs’ 
ex parte contacts with parties,141 limiting the duties that the agency 
can assign ALJs,142 restricting those who can directly supervise 
ALJs,143 restricting the agencies’ ability to award “merit” pay or 
provide a performance rating,144 and expressly requiring ALJs to act 
impartially.145 
Indeed, indicia of independence may be irrelevant to, or at least 
unnecessary for, impartiality. Only nine percent of non-SSA ALJs 
report feeling pressured to rule differently.146 And administrative 
judges (“AJs”), who lack ALJs’ structural protections and preside over 
informal administrative adjudications,147 had less anxiety over their 
impartiality and independence than ALJs.148 Surely, the argument 
 
 136.  Gedid, supra note 123, at 40 (citing Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25). 
 137.  See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 139.  Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1222 n.150. 
 140.  Bruff, supra note 47, at 350. 
 141.  5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d) (2006). 
 142.  Id. § 554(d)(2). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. § 5372. 
 145.  Id. § 556(b) (“The functions of presiding employees . . . shall be conducted in an 
impartial manner.”). 
 146.  Moliterno, supra note 60, at n.108 (citing Koch, supra note 135, at 278). 
 147.  See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 262 & n.249 (2008) 
(citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 309 (4th ed. 2004)) 
(stating that informal adjudication is often presided over by AJs with lower pay and less 
independence from the agency). 
 148.  See Koch, supra note 135, at 279. If ALJs lack sufficient indicia of independence, then 
impartiality concerns over AJs, who lack ALJs’ protections, would be even graver and threaten 
much of the federal administrative state. Moreover, such a conclusion would also seem to bring 
Article I judges’ impartiality into question because they have independence that is similar to 
ALJs. Although certain concerns underlying my proposal also apply to AJs and Article I judges, I 
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goes, the APA’s statutory protections and statistical evidence satisfy 
the minimal standards of due process, especially in light of the 
Supreme Court’s ready acceptance of most administrative 
procedures149 and the indication from the AJs’ responses that 
independence has little effect on an administrative adjudicator’s self-
perception of impartiality. 
2. Reassessing Existing Doctrine 
Not surprisingly, scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs 
have sufficient indicia of impartiality.150 Despite the absence of 
scholarly consensus, Professor Harold Bruff has stated that “the 
Supreme Court has upheld this general arrangement against due 
process attack.”151 Three Supreme Court decisions routinely come to 
the APA’s defense in a Constitution-based impartiality challenge: 
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,152 Butz v. 
Economou,153 and Withrow v. Larkin.154 Although certain of these 
 
do not include them here because they do not likely face the same Appointments Clause 
problems and because other factual distinctions exist between them and ALJs. 
 149.  Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51.  
 150.  Compare, e.g., Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 4 n.11 (“[T]he APA protections 
insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates.”), McNeil, supra note 127, at 511 (“[D]ue 
process jurisprudence . . . [dispels] the notion that the measure of due process to which litigants 
are entitled in administrative proceedings includes an independent adjudicator possessed of 
salary and tenure protection . . . .”), and Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51 (arguing that ALJs 
need only so much independence as to ensure their impartiality and suggesting that impartiality 
exists), with 2 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 442–43 (1959) (contending that relationship 
between agency and ALJ creates actual and apparent bias), Gedid, supra note 123, at 40 
(“[T]here is a strong argument that . . . for ALJ independence to exist, the ALJ cannot be 
‘beholden’ to the agency for which she works for compensation, tenure, and/or conditions of 
employment.” (citing Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It Be 
Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863, 864–65 (1995))), Levinson, supra note 25, at 537–38 
(noting uncertainty as to ALJs’ impartiality), Lubbers, supra note 2, at 110 (stating that  
“ALJs . . . are subject to doubts about their independence due in part to their employment,” but 
not resolving whether ALJs are sufficiently independent or impartial), Redish & Marshall, supra 
note 135, at 499, 504 (arguing that ALJs need salary and tenure protection similar or identical to 
Article III judges to preserve due process), Timony, supra note 2, at 828 (concluding that 
agencies’ ability to proceed against an ALJ creates an “appearance of impropriety”), and Karen 
Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model 
Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 544 (1985).  
 151.  Bruff, supra note 47, at 346 (referring to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)); id. at 
347 (“Most administrative adjudication is not very vulnerable to constitutional invalidation 
under the due process clause.”); see also Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1350–51. 
 152.  345 U.S. 128 (1953). 
 153.  438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 154.  421 U.S. 35 (1975). In Weiss v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the use of 
military judges despite their lack of a fixed term in office or lifetime tenure. See 510 U.S. 163, 
179–81 (1994). But Weiss’s applicability to the civil administrative state is indeterminate. On one 
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decisions strongly suggest that ALJs are sufficiently impartial in fact 
and appearance, scholars have not considered the impact of the 
decisions’ limitations, especially after Caperton and Free Enterprise 
Fund. 
Ramspeck, for instance, has limited relevance. In Ramspeck, 
ALJs challenged certain rules governing ALJs, which the precursor to 
the OPM and the MSPB (the Civil Service Commission) promulgated 
under the APA.155 No constitutional question was posed or answered. 
In rejecting the ALJs’ contention that reductions in force were 
impermissible under the APA, the Court stated that Congress 
intended ALJs “not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at the whim or 
caprice of the agency or for political reasons.”156 And the Court 
referred to ALJs as “partially independent”157 and “semi-independent 
subordinate hearing officers.”158 But these descriptions of 
congressional intent do not answer whether Congress successfully 
effectuated its intent, whether the protections provide sufficient 
impartiality, or whether the protections offend the President’s 
supervisory power. 
The two remaining cases, however, are more germane. In Butz, 
an individual brought suit against certain Department of Agriculture 
officials who took part in an administrative adjudication.159 He 
asserted several causes of action, including those premised on 
violations of the Due Process Clause.160 The sole issue that the 
Supreme Court resolved concerned the nature of immunity to which 
the various officials were entitled.161 As in Ramspeck, the Court did 
not decide whether ALJs have sufficient impartiality, but it hinted as 
much. In determining that ALJs were entitled to absolute judicial 
immunity, the Court stated that ALJs were “functionally comparable” 
to judges162 and listed the APA’s panoply of protections to “guarantee 
 
hand, the Court’s opinion suggests that lifetime or termed tenure is unnecessary for adjudicators 
who are subject to removal by the executive branch. On the other hand, the Court refused to 
apply Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), because that case applied in civil contexts, 
suggesting that Mathews’s three-part balancing test may require more. 
 155.  See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 134 (outlining the arguments of each party). 
 156.  Id. at 142. 
 157.  Id. at 131. 
 158.  Id. at 132. 
 159.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1978). 
 160.  See id. at 482–83. 
 161.  See id. at 485 (rejecting the United States’ argument that federal officials are immune 
from damages liability even if the violation was knowing, was deliberate, and infringed 
constitutional rights). 
 162.  Id. at 513; accord Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 
(D.D.C. 1984). 
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[ALJs’] independence.”163 Indeed, absolute immunity “preserv[ed 
ALJs’] independent judgment.”164 Nevertheless, the decision does not 
discuss (at least in any detail) the power of removal and the internal 
pressures that weigh on ALJs as agency officials despite the powerful 
force that the Free Enterprise Fund Court would later understand the 
removal power to have,165 much less explain why the APA’s 
protections are sufficient to ensure impartiality. 
Withrow likewise suggests that ALJs have sufficient 
impartiality, but it, too, is not dispositive. In Withrow, a doctor 
challenged the ability of a licensing board to preside over a 
nonadversary, investigatory hearing and also a later adversary, merits 
hearing.166 The Court unanimously upheld the arrangement. The 
Court noted that it sought to “prevent even the probability of 
unfairness”167 and that a challenge to the administrative structure 
would have to “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in 
those serving as adjudicators,”168 in light of “a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness.”169 But the Court 
found no problem because the board was merely determining whether 
a full hearing was necessary, much like a judicial officer rendering a 
probable cause determination, without deciding whether a regulatory 
violation actually occurred.170 And the Court indicated that the Due 
Process Clause does not require separated investigative and 
adjudicatory functions for agency members.171 
Withrow does not fully address the plight of ALJs. The Court’s 
opinion, like that in Butz, does not address the effect of the removal 
power on an adjudicator’s impartiality. Indeed, it does not address 
ALJs at all. Instead, Withrow concerns the heads of agencies.172 
Perhaps one might argue that if agency heads can investigate, 
prosecute, adjudicate, and overrule ALJs’ opinions in toto, there 
should be little concern over their subordinates’ impartiality. But that 
argument overlooks ALJs’ functional judicial status and the different 
 
 163.  Butz, 438 U.S. at 514. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See supra Part II.B (discussing significance of Free Enterprise Fund). 
 166.  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1975). 
 167.  Id. at 47. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See id. at 53–58 (explaining why board’s behavior was acceptable).  
 171.  See id. at 52 (explaining that case law, and federal and state courts, support this 
contention). 
 172.  See id. at 55 n.20 (noting that the Agency employee actually performed the 
investigation and an assistant attorney general presented the evidence to the board). 
2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/23/2013 4:41 PM 
2013] RESOLVING THE ALJ QUANDARY 823 
 
expectations that parties have before a judge as opposed to an agency 
member.173 The ALJ is a neutral individual whose opinion the agency 
must review, and the ALJ’s neutrality and opinion have a meaningful 
procedural and substantive effect. Although the agency can (but rarely 
does) reverse an ALJ’s decision, the substance of the ALJ’s opinion 
may matter for judicial review under the APA. The courts will review 
only agency decisions adverse to a nonagency party (because if the 
party prevails before the agency, the agency will not appeal its own 
adverse decision, which it has the power to reverse, to the courts). The 
ALJ’s opinion—especially as to facts and credibility—helps the court 
determine the matter with the additional help of an educated neutral’s 
view.174 The ALJ’s proceedings and opinion also provide an 
administrative procedure to help protect fundamental rights in 
adjudication and thereby create for the parties the reasonable 
expectation of a fair, impartial proceeding. In short, the ALJ’s place 
within the federal administrative apparatus does not mean that 
impartiality and its concomitant indicia of independence are 
irrelevant. 
3. Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund’s Impact on Existing Doctrine 
Even if Ramspeck, Butz, and Withrow together established that 
ALJs have sufficient impartiality, the Court’s more recent decision in 
Caperton may suggest otherwise. Indeed, Caperton does what those 
decisions did not: it focuses on adjudicators’ selection and removal, 
 
 173.  The Withrow Court also referred to Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). See 
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 49–50. In Perales, the Supreme Court rejected a social security claimant’s 
argument that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record in nonadversarial hearings violated the Due 
Process Clause. The Court held that doing so would “assume[] too much and would bring down 
too many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and 
growing complexity.” See Perales, 402 U.S. at 410. This conclusion is sound because the ALJ was 
not an advocate for the Agency; the Agency was unrepresented. But the Perales Court’s 
reasoning is not satisfying. The Court merely offers unsupported conclusions that (1) the 
procedures are “working well” and (2) the procedures satisfy due process because the 
government, which creates, implements, and potentially benefits from the procedures, has made 
them ubiquitous. See id. Moreover, like Butz and Withrow, Perales does not address whether a 
sharp Damoclean sword of removal dulls the ALJ’s impartiality. Perhaps the better support for 
sufficient impartiality is found in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (“We agree . . . that 
prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting 
as a decision maker.”). 
 174.  See, e.g., Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, 571 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Henderson, J., 
concurring) (“The DEA is the ultimate fact finder but ‘[t]he agency's departures from the [ALJ’s] 
findings are vulnerable if they fail to reflect attentive consideration to the [ALJ’s] decision.’ ” 
(quoting Greater Bos. Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Bos. Edison Co. v. 
FERC, 885 F.2d 962, 968–69 (1st Cir. 1989); see infra note 195 (explaining that courts carefully 
view agency findings contrary to ALJ factual findings). 
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albeit in the judicial-election context. In Caperton, the president of a 
corporate defendant, which was in the process of appealing an 
unfavorable verdict, had contributed three million dollars to have 
Justice Benjamin elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals.175 Justice Benjamin defeated the incumbent justice by fewer 
than fifty thousand votes.176 In response to recusal motions, Justice 
Benjamin said that he had no actual bias and that there was no 
allegation of a quid pro quo arrangement.177 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that due process required Justice 
Benjamin’s recusal.178 Evidence of a quid pro quo agreement or of 
actual bias was unnecessary.179 Instead, the Court was “concerned 
with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to 
disregard neutrality.”180 The Court was looking not necessarily for 
Withrow’s “probability of unfairness,”181 but instead an 
“unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ”182 The Court suggested that 
such bias exists  
when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and 
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing 
the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. . . . [S]imilar 
fears of bias can arise when—without the other parties’ consent—a man chooses the 
judge in his own cause.183  
Applying this standard, the Court noted that the president of the 
defendant-corporation knew that the appeal from an unfavorable 
verdict was pending, the election was decided by fewer than fifty 
thousand votes, and the president’s contributions had a significant 
and disproportionate impact on the election.184 Because of this, the 
Court found “a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required 
 
 175.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009). 
 176.  See id. (noting Justice Benjamin received 382,036 votes while his rival received 334,301 
votes). 
 177.  See id. at 872–75, 886 (reviewing facts of case). 
 178.  See id. at 884–87 (explaining reasons for holding). 
 179.  See id. at 884–85 (arguing that risk of bias was substantial enough). 
 180.  Id. at 878. 
 181.  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
 182.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66 
(1971)). The Court enunciated another standard besides the “probability of unfairness” and the 
“unconstitutional potential for bias.” The Court also indicated that it was looking for “the 
probability of actual bias [that] rises to an unconstitutional level.” Id. at 887. Perhaps these 
three standards can be reconciled. The “probability of actual bias” may be the same as the 
“probability of unfairness,” with the unfairness being the actual bias. The “potential for bias” 
may be unconstitutional only when it rises to the level of the probability of actual bias. 
 183.  Id. at 870. 
 184.  Id. at 885–86. 
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Justice Benjamin’s recusal” because it appeared that the defendant 
“ch[ose] the judge in [its] own cause.”185 
Although the Court discussed its decision within the judicial-
election context,186 its reasoning seems even more compelling when 
applied to ALJs. Caperton appears to consider a party’s impact on a 
judge’s selection and perhaps the effect that a losing party could have 
to punish the judge who it helped place on the bench in future judicial 
elections. West Virginia voters directly chose Justice Benjamin. 
Nevertheless, the corporate defendant’s disproportionate 
contributions’ indirect impact on the election created an 
“unconstitutional potential for bias.” The government, like the 
defendant in Caperton, is frequently a party to proceedings before the 
ALJ. But the government directly chooses the ALJ from a list of three 
candidates presented to it. If agencies obtain the ability to engage in 
selective certification, their ability to appoint is even more unbounded. 
In either case, the agency directly and literally “chooses the judge in 
[its] own cause,” without, as in the case of federal judges, any approval 
from another branch. Moreover, the agency is the party that can 
initiate removal proceedings against the ALJ, not merely indirectly 
fund opposition forces in a later election. Indeed, it is not even the 
government in general that selects ALJs and initiates removal 
proceedings; it is the very agency that appears before the ALJ. 
Because the agency’s role in selecting and removing the ALJ is much 
more direct than in Caperton, it is difficult to see how an 
“unconstitutional potential for bias” does not exist for federal ALJs if 
Caperton applies outside of the judicial-election context. 
Moreover, as discussed previously in Part II.B, Free Enterprise 
Fund suggests that the President must have sufficient supervisory 
power over all members of the executive branch so that the President 
can be held accountable for what his or her agents do. To ensure the 
President’s supervisory power, the Court has begun limiting tenure 
protections for executive officials, such as the PCAOB members.187 If 
the Court were to follow suit with ALJs and permit the President or a 
principal officer to remove ALJs for any reason, it is difficult to see 
how an “unconstitutional potential for bias,” or indeed a “probability of 
actual bias” would not exist. The President or a supervising officer 
could, despite potential political backlash, have the ALJ find facts or 
 
 185.  Id. at 886, 902. 
 186.  Id. at 881–82 (“This problem arises in the context of judicial elections, a framework not 
presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.”). 
 187.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (agreeing with the 
government that unconstitutional tenure provisions are severable).  
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apply law in certain ways. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that 
“one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot 
be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the 
latter’s will.”188 A challenge to the President’s supervision of ALJs may 
not be merely a theoretical matter, given the Court’s recent, solicitous 
reception to separation-of-powers challenges.189 
Functional limitations on the President’s supervisory power—
such as the understood ability of ALJs to act without agency 
interference190 and ALJs’ APA protections—may be less, if at all, 
relevant to due process and removal-power inquiries after Free 
Enterprise Fund. That decision strongly suggests that practical indicia 
of independence or control are normally immaterial to the President’s 
removal-power inquiry because the Court rejected Justice Breyer’s 
functional inquiry that considered other, more meaningful methods of 
presidential control, such as rulemaking powers.191 Instead, the Court 
looked only to the President’s removal power and held that the lack of 
sufficient removal power in the PCAOB scheme alone impeded the 
President’s supervisory power.192 Supervision is merely the flipside to 
independence. If the removal power is significant and apparently 
necessary for adequate presidential supervision, the removal power 
should have a similar, inverse impact on independence and 
impartiality. The limited ability of Congress after Free Enterprise 
Fund to rely on functional methods of control and independence is 
what, in part, may render the ALJ’s quandary so difficult to solve. 
Finally, the agency’s ability to overrule an ALJ on both fact 
and law does not mean that an ALJ’s decision is meaningless.193 The 
 
 188.  Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
 189.  See generally Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that bankruptcy court 
lacked authority under Article III to enter judgment on state-law counterclaim); Free Enter. 
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150–51 (deciding separation-of-powers issues on interlocutory review); 
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995) (discussing claim, based on Appointments 
Clause of Article II of the Constitution, that there was a “ ‘trespass upon the executive power of 
appointment’ ”). 
 190.  See supra note 140 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Russell L. Weaver, Management of 
ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and Agencies, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 303, 321 (1995) (“ALJs 
who serve at agencies that have non-ALJ administrators repeatedly indicated that those 
administrators have not attempted to interfere with their decisional independence.”). 
 191.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155–56 (refuting dissent’s position); id. at 3170–73 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the SEC controls PCAOB’s adjudicatory and rulemaking 
authority).  
 192.  See id. at 3158–59 (discussing threat posed by insufficient removal power); see also id. 
at 3156–57 (discussing Framers’ view of importance of removal power). 
 193.  See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (describing ALJ’s initial decision authority); Universal 
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494–97 (1951) (explaining importance of findings of 
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ALJ’s credibility findings can be very significant, affecting whether 
substantial evidence exists for an agency’s contrary decision on 
administrative appeal.194 Indeed, courts review with a more careful 
eye agency findings that are contrary to ALJs’ factual findings.195 
Considering appellate courts’ more deferential review of final agency 
action as compared to lower court factual findings,196 ALJs’ 
impartiality may be even more important than Article III judges’ 
impartiality. 
Despite concerns over ALJ impartiality and despite Caperton 
and Free Enterprise Fund’s contrary suggestion, the Supreme Court 
may not find a due process violation, given its wariness of upsetting 
long-standing administrative practices.197 But the absence of 
constitutional infirmity does not mean that the current administrative 
system is in excellent health. These concerns, like those that surround 
ALJs’ selection and removal, support finding a new process of ALJ 
selection and removal that all interested constituencies can champion. 
III. OTHER PROPOSED, YET INCOMPLETE, REFORMS 
Scholars and ALJs have proposed various changes to ALJs’ 
selection, removal, and independence. Some of the most promising 
proposals, discussed below, include the creation of a unified ALJ corps 
with a newly established supervising agency, ALJ self-regulation, and 
even the provision of Article III protections to ALJs. But these 
proposals fail to consider, much less resolve, all three separation-of-
powers issues surrounding ALJs. Each of these proposals thus has—
befitting ALJs’ current demigod status—an Achilles heel.198 
 
examiner); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1225 (acknowledging weight of authority given to ALJ 
decisions). 
 194.  See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496–97 (noting legislative committee reports 
emphasize importance of ALJ decisions); see also Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 
1079–81 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to enforce NLRB’s order and reversing an ALJ’s determination 
that relied exclusively on testimony that the ALJ discredited).  
 195.  Penasquitos Vill, Inc., 565 F.2d at 1078 (referring to NLRB v. Tom Johnson, Inc., 378 
F.2d 342, 344 (9th Cir. 1967), and NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499 (2d 
Cir. 1967)). 
 196.  See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (explaining that the “ ‘substantial 
evidence’ standard [for review of agency decisions] . . . is somewhat less strict than the [clearly 
erroneous standard for the review of lower court factual findings]”); accord Chen v. Mukasey, 510 
F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The substantial evidence standard . . . is more deferential than 
the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard . . . .”).  
 197.  See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). 
 198.  In fairness to these proposals’ advocates, I am not aware of any scholarship that 
directly examines all three problems. Moreover, the problematic nature of the ALJs’ tiered-
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A. Unified Corps 
Perhaps the most popular remedial proposal is for a unified 
ALJ corps (sometimes referred to as an ALJ central panel), appointed 
and supervised by an existing or newly created independent agency.199 
Under this proposal, ALJs are not appointed by or assigned to a 
specific agency. Instead, a corps of ALJs, whose members an 
independent agency appoints, hears cases from various agencies.200 
Some of the central-panel proposals would permit ALJs to issue final 
decisions.201 
A federal ALJ corps, however, does not likely resolve the three 
separation-of-powers concerns. The independent agency’s appointment 
of ALJs would likely comply with the Appointments Clause because 
the independent agency, if “not subordinate to or contained within any 
other [executive] component,” would constitute a “department.”202 But 
the presidential-supervision concerns remain because, without further 
changes to the current appointment process, two tiers of tenure 
protections would continue to shield ALJs from the President’s 
control. The appointing agency would be independent because of 
tenure protection for its head.203 And ALJs presumably would likewise 
 
tenure protections, among other things, did not arise in any substantial way until June 2010 
with Free Enterprise Fund. 
 199.  See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (discussing intensified movement for a 
unified administrative trial court or centralized corps of judges); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 
1227–33 (articulating support that the proposal for a central panel has received); Scalia, supra 
note 92, at 79 (explaining improper influence issue could be resolved with a unified ALJ corps). 
Similarly, the Federal ALJ Conference has proposed transferring the OPM’s selection assistance 
of ALJs and other responsibilities to a new independent agency, the Administrative Law Judge 
Conference. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–07 (discussing history and reasons for proposal); 
see also Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 38–40 (suggesting creation of an independent 
oversight agency and discussing California’s Agency that oversees judicial conduct). But doing so 
would not address any of the three stated concerns because it merely transfers currently existing 
powers from one independent agency—that ALJs think has generally ignored them—to another 
more sympathetic one. This transfer does not have heads of departments actually appoint ALJs, 
alter the President’s supervisory power, or address ALJ independence. 
 200.  See McNeil, supra note 127, at 480 (pointing out consistency of independence of ALJs 
with due process requirements); Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative 
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) (describing how corps of 
ALJs promotes adjudicative independence). 
 201.  See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1230 (comparing a central panel of ALJs to Article III 
judges). 
 202.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (defining “department”).  
 203.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies 
. . . whose heads are not removable at will.”), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
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receive the tenure protection that they currently possess.204 If one or 
both of the tenure-protection provisions are invalidated, substantial 
due process concerns may exist because the new appointing and 
removing agency—which may not be independent after a tiered-
tenure-protection analysis—may attempt to influence ALJs’ decisions 
improperly.205 Moreover, even if the tenure protections are permissible 
under Article II, any attempt to give ALJs the power to issue final 
decisions places policy control within the ALJs, not the agencies 
themselves, and thus limits the President’s ability to ensure that the 
law is faithfully executed.206  
Yet, even if an ALJ central panel did cure all three problems, a 
federal ALJ corps is not likely in the offing. Numerous states have 
created ALJ corps,207 which have received universal praise.208 Many 
members of the committee that proposed the federal APA to Congress 
advocated an ALJ corps.209 And since then, many scholars, 
committees, members of the bar, a congressman, and ALJs have 
joined the unsuccessful crusade.210 Even so, by 1992 the 
 
 204.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (listing possible actions against ALJs); MODEL ACT 
CREATING A STATE CENTRAL HEARING AGENCY § 1–6(a)(3), (a)(4) (1997) (listing reasons for 
removal). 
 205.  See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (explaining probable bias that may 
occur if President could remove ALJs for any reason); see also Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special 
Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 417 (2001) (proposing that 
ALJ corps is “removable only for good cause and, then, only after notice and an opportunity to be 
heard by an impartial tribunal”); Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 45 (explaining that ALJs in 
certain states, such as Texas, can be removed at will by the Chief ALJ). 
 206.  Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The 
Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 463 (1999) 
(noting separation-of-powers problems that arose when Louisiana permitted ALJs to issue final 
decisions from which a losing agency could not appeal). 
 207.  Rossi, supra note 200, at 568; see Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative 
Law Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 
11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 13 n.18 (2002) (listing twenty-four states that have adopted central 
panels). 
 208.  See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1229 (citing Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon’s Hearing 
Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57, 89 (2003); Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative 
Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994); Bruce H. Johnson, 
Strengthening Professionalism Within an Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota 
Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 446 (2001)). Nonetheless, a common criticism of the ALJ 
corps is that agencies lose the efficiency and specialized knowledge that exists when ALJs are 
housed within individual agencies. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 57, at 516. 
 209.  See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1227. 
 210.  See Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (explaining the LaMacchia Committee’s 1973 
recommendation for study of an ALJ corps and former ABA President Bernard Segal’s advocacy 
for an independent ALJ corps in 1976); id. at 124 (advocating “increased scrutiny” for the ALJ 
corps proposal); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1229 (collecting scholarly and ALJ proposals); see 
also GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 22 (“The ALJ Corps option was proposed repeatedly in 
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Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) 
recommended that Congress not create an ALJ corps.211 Given the 
ACUS’s lack of support for an ALJ corps and the proposal’s failure to 
gain political traction after more than sixty years, the proposal to 
create a federal ALJ corps appears moribund. 
B. Self-Regulation 
Another set of proposals grants ALJs the power to self-
regulate. Other professions, such as Article III judges, lawyers, and 
physicians, regulate the conduct of their members.212 Indeed, because 
Federal Judicial Councils monitor judicial behavior, Congress has 
largely avoided regulating judges.213 Under one general proposal, 
ALJs would be permitted to create an ethics code,214 investigate 
alleged ALJ wrongdoing, and impose sanctions for inappropriate 
conduct.215 Under another self-regulation proposal, a new independent 
agency of ALJs would assume the OPM’s current ALJ-selection-
assistance duties, improve the formal administrative adjudicatory 
process, and ensure compliance with ethical standards.216 
These proposals do not address appointment, removal, or 
impartiality concerns. Neither proposal alters ALJs’ current 
questionable method of selection by heads of agencies who are not 
heads of departments. Neither appears to alter ALJs’ two tiers of 
tenure protection or the existing removal mechanisms, and thus 
neither proposal gives the ALJs more than the power to recommend or 
impose certain adverse action against a derelict ALJ. Because ALJs’ 
selection and removal are essentially left unaltered under both 
proposals, self-regulation would have a minimal impact on 
impartiality concerns. The failure to consider the selection bias, the 
agency-view inculcation, and threat of removal renders the 
 
Congress between 1983 and 1995.”); Scalia, supra note 92, at 79 (discussing ALJ corps’s 
beneficial effect on efficiency and likely detrimental effect on accountability and supervision); 
Timony, supra note 2, at 819 (discussing Senator Heflin’s 1983 bill to create a unified corps).  
 211.  See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1228 (referring to PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN. 
CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1059 (1992)). 
 212.  Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43–45. 
 213.  Id. at 43. 
 214.  ALJs’ unsettled ethical duties are a perennial subject of academic discussion. See 
generally Salkin, supra note 207, at 7–32; Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law 
Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 321–48 (2002); Diana Gillis, Note, Closing an 
Administrative Loophole: Ethics for the Administrative Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 
863–76 (2009). 
 215.  Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43. 
 216.  See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106–07. 
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promulgation and enforcement of an ethics code an ineffective tool to 
improve actual and perceived ALJ impartiality. 
C. Article III Protections 
A third suggestion provides ALJs essentially the same tenure 
protections that Article III judges enjoy. To combat agency pressure on 
ALJ decisionmaking, two prominent scholars have proposed giving 
ALJs lifetime salary protection and permitting their removal only 
through a statutory-impeachment process.217 This proposal should 
remedy any lingering due process concerns, even after Caperton and 
Free Enterprise Fund, because ALJs would have the same 
independence as Article III judges, although that independence would 
arise from statutory, not constitutional, law.218 
But this proposal does not resolve appointment or supervision 
concerns. The proposal fails to alter ALJs’ selection, leaving heads of 
agencies, as opposed to departments, to select some ALJs.219 Moreover, 
it would exacerbate presidential-supervision concerns. To be sure, this 
reform would remove one tier of tenure protection and thus may, at a 
superficial level, solve the problem presented in Free Enterprise Fund. 
Yet removal through impeachment completely deprives the executive 
branch of power to seek an ALJ’s removal because the House of 
Representatives, not the executive branch, initiates impeachment 
proceedings.220 Thus, even if this proposal resolves due process 
 
 217.  See Redish & Marshall, supra note 135, at 499; see also id. at 504 (“[D]ue process is 
inadequately protected when an individual must depend on an adjudicator who lacks salary and 
tenure protection (such as most state court judges and all ALJs) to protect an entitlement to a 
life, liberty, or property interest.”). Redish and Marshall’s proposal is vague as to whether the 
salary and tenure protections are lifetime protections. They do not use the term “lifetime,” but 
they do mention the protections and then state that “ALJs would then be shielded from such 
pressures in much the same way that article III judges are.” See id. at 499. 
 218.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But others have concluded that Article III protections are 
unnecessary under due process jurisprudence. See McNeil, supra note 127, at 511; Daniel J. 
Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 433 (1989) (suggesting that salary 
and tenure protections may render judges more political, not apolitical). 
 219.  See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 220.  If the proposed statutory impeachment models constitutional impeachment, the House 
of Representatives would impeach ALJs, and the Senate would preside over the trial and decide 
whether to convict. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; art. I, §§ 2–3. The President has no role in the 
impeachment process. Although the Supreme Court in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 
483–85 (1886), held that Congress could limit the incidental removal power when a department 
head appoints an inferior officer, the removal of the cadet-engineer in Perkins had to proceed 
through a court martial, an organ of the executive branch. It is far from clear that Congress 
could permit a department head to appoint and then usurp the removal power through a 
statutory-impeachment process, leaving the President or department head without any role in 
the sole removal process. 
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concerns, it leaves unaddressed Appointments Clause problems and 
presidential-supervision difficulties of the highest magnitude. 
IV. AN INTERBRANCH-APPOINTMENT REMEDY 
These proposals, even if incomplete or politically unpalatable, 
demonstrate the widespread sense that ALJs are not operating, to 
paraphrase Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, in the best of all possible 
worlds.221 In the spirit of creating a better administrative world, I 
propose that Congress assign the power to appoint (and the incidental 
power to discipline and remove) ALJs to the “Courts of Law,” namely 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. I first briefly outline 
the key portions of my statutory proposal for the D.C. Circuit to 
appoint and discipline ALJs. I then further explain why I have 
structured the proposal as I have to resolve the three constitutional 
questions and address agencies’ and ALJs’ concerns. Although, as 
discussed above, other structural proposals have tended to disappear 
into the political ether, my proposal may be able to gain more traction 
because it gives, through a relatively simple statutory change, both 
agencies and ALJs some, but not all, of what they want. 
A. General Mechanics of an ALJ Interbranch Appointment 
Under a new statute and its implementing rules, the D.C. 
Circuit should appoint, discipline, and remove ALJs. The court has the 
knowledge, time, and logistics to do so. It is widely considered the 
most influential court on matters of administrative law, routinely 
reviewing numerous important administrative law cases, including 
ALJs’ decisions.222 The court also has a substantially lighter caseload 
 
 221.  See e.g., VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 84 (ch.1, ll. 42–44) (Librairie Nizet 1959) (1759). 
 222.  See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CASES OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 3–4 (1982) (estimating that 
forty-five percent of “high burden agency cases” are filed in the D.C. Circuit); John M. Golden, 
The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit . . . hears a disproportionate share of the 
United States’ administrative law cases.”) (citing John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. 
Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2006) (“One-third of the D.C. 
Circuit appeals are from agency decisions. That figure is less than twenty percent nationwide.”)); 
Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of 
Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1103 n.14 (2001) (citing 
Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 
1202 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the 
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 621 & n.2 (1994)) (noting that D.C. Circuit decides nearly one-
third of all direct appeals from federal agencies).  
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than all other federal circuits.223 With the administrative assistance of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AOC”), its 
judges have the capacity for the administrative duty of selecting and 
disciplining ALJs. The Circuit also has the added benefit of a prime 
location. Like numerous ALJs, most agencies, and the AOC, the D.C. 
Circuit is based in D.C. 
The selection process could proceed much in the same way that 
it does now. ALJ candidates could continue to take the preliminary 
examination that the OPM currently administers under the D.C. 
Circuit’s auspices, with the AOC’s administrative support.224 After the 
examination, with the AOC’s assistance, the D.C. Circuit could then 
assign each candidate a score based on his or her examination, 
experience, and qualifications, much as the OPM does now.225 Through 
a notice-and-comment procedure that the courts of appeals currently 
use for bankruptcy-judge candidates,226 the court could then solicit 
comments on the three highest-scoring candidates. The agency for 
which the ALJ would work would, like other interested parties, be 
able to provide comments and indicate its preferred candidate from 
one of the three candidates. 
But the agency, unlike other interested parties, could also 
submit its own candidate and thereby create a roster of four 
 
 223.  The D.C. Circuit decided 173 cases on the merits per active judge in 2010. In 
comparison, the national average was 459. Relatively small circuits decided more cases on the 
merits per judge: 502 for the Eighth Circuit, 415 for the First Circuit, and 242 for the Tenth 
Circuit. See Federal Court Management Statistics December 2010: Courts of Appeals, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2010Dec.pl (last visited Nov. 30, 
2012) (select circuit for report at prompt); see also Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 
549, 562 n.63 (2002) (referring to Jonathan Groner, Circuit Pick Caught in the Middle: GOP 
Senator Questions Need to Fill Vacancy, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2000, at 1); John B. Oakley, 
Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive Species, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 123, 126 (2006). Indeed, the relatively light caseload may explain what some view as 
the D.C. Circuit’s “unusually intrusive approach to administrative law.” See Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Comment, Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1126 
(1995). Although some have attributed the D.C. Circuit’s smaller caseload to the complexity of its 
cases, see, e.g., Bruff, supra note 222, at 1236, I am skeptical. In my admittedly anecdotal 
experience, death-penalty, prisoner-rights, and habeas cases can be extremely time-consuming, 
with large records and inadequate briefing. The D.C. Circuit hears few of these cases. See U.S. 
COURTS, supra (select D.C. Circuit at prompt).  
 224.  See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.  
 225.  See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 226.  See, e.g., Official Notice, Sixth Circuit Judicial Council, Office of the Circuit Exec. (May 
29, 2011), available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/documents/TNM_Public_Notice.pdf 
(request for comment on bankruptcy-judge candidates). 
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candidates.227 If the agency submits a candidate for consideration, 
interested parties could then provide comments on the agency’s 
submitted candidate. After considering the examination and the 
received comments, the D.C. Circuit would appoint the ALJ from the 
list of three or four candidates, under what I refer to as a new “Rule of 
Three or Four.” Each agency would retain the authority to determine 
the number of ALJs that it needs.228 
Agencies, among others, could request that the D.C. Circuit 
discipline or remove an ALJ for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance,” the same standard that governs bankruptcy judges229 
and numerous other federal adjudicators.230 Per statute, any agency 
complaint concerning an ALJ would be placed on a “fast track” that 
requires the D.C. Circuit to decide the matter within two months. 
Prompt resolution would ensure that agencies are able to have 
incompetent or malfeasant ALJs removed promptly. Agencies would 
retain a right to suspend ALJs immediately when the agency 
“considers that action necessary in the interests of national security,” 
with limited judicial review.231 Other “interested parties,” as the term 
is understood under the APA (§ 554(c)), could also seek ALJs’ removal 
or discipline.232 The D.C. Circuit itself would have no power to 
discipline or remove an ALJ sua sponte. 
By vesting the D.C. Circuit with appointment and removal 
power, the D.C. Circuit would become another actor responsible for 
 
 227.  See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 9–10 (stating that agencies seek more influence over 
selection process, including ability to select candidates with specialized knowledge). 
 228.  See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006). My proposal concerns the future appointment of ALJs. As 
for current ALJs, I would suggest “grandfathering” them into the new system by permitting the 
D.C. Circuit to appoint them summarily. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2006) (prescribing a similar 
appointment process for improperly appointed administrative patent judges). This 
“grandfathering” would ease the administrative difficulties with appointing so many incumbent 
ALJs. But, as with other solutions to prior improper appointments, it would not resolve whether 
decisions made prior to D.C. Circuit’s appointment are valid. See id. § 6(d).  
 229.  See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006). 
 230.  See infra note 337 and accompanying text. Although the Court in Bowsher v. Synar 
suggested that removal under this provision could permit removal for “any number of actual or 
perceived transgressions,” 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986), the Court in Free Enterprise Fund 
suggested, without referring to Bowsher, that the provision for removal provided only narrow 
grounds for removal, see Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157–58 (2010). These 
narrower grounds for removal limit the discretion of the removing party—here the D.C. Circuit—
and thus limit the D.C. Circuit’s control or supervision over the ALJs. 
 231.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7532.  
 232.  Agencies would still decide motions for ALJ bias. See id. § 556(b). If the court became 
inundated with frivolous motions from “interested parties” whom the ALJ likely ruled against, 
the Court, per statute, could adopt rules that permit single judges to decide whether a complaint 
is sufficiently substantial to be referred to a panel for decision. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 27(c) 
(permitting single circuit judge to decide motions).  
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ALJs. The D.C. Circuit would replace the MSPB’s role in removing 
and disciplining ALJs and the OPM’s and agencies’ role in hiring 
ALJs. Nevertheless, the OPM would continue to share responsibilities 
concerning increased ALJ pay, temporary assignments, and ensuring 
ALJ decisional independence. Indeed, because the AOC, not the OPM, 
would assist the D.C. Circuit with ALJ hiring, the OPM should be able 
to focus on ALJ performance and decisional independence.233 
As discussed below, these changes to ALJ selection will resolve 
(or at least substantially mitigate) the appointment, removal, and 
impartiality concerns discussed in Part II. Moreover, to Dr. Pangloss’s 
relief, this system will also provide a much better world, if not the best 
possible one, for ALJs and agencies even if the constitutional concerns 
above do not amount to constitutional violations. 
B. Clarifying Limits on Interbranch Appointment and Removal 
As described below, the D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs is 
constitutional and resolves the appointment issue surrounding ALJs. 
Depending on whether ALJs are inferior officers or employees, the 
Appointments Clause’s text either permits my proposed interbranch 
appointment or is otherwise irrelevant. The Supreme Court has, 
however, limited Congress’s ability to permit the “Courts of Law” to 
appoint executive-branch officers under incongruous-appointment or 
separation-of-powers theories. Under these perhaps distinct but 
incestuous theories, the appointment must not improperly impede the 
functioning of the judicial and executive branches. Congress can very 
likely satisfy the inquiry if it vests the D.C. Circuit with the 
interbranch appointment of ALJs. As part of my analysis below, I 
propose a three-part inquiry to simplify and clarify the Court’s 
current, partially redundant, and vague incongruous-appointment 
analysis. 
1. The Appointments Clause 
If ALJs are inferior officers, the Excepting Clause expressly 
permits Congress, “as [it] think[s] proper,” to vest their appointment 
 
 233.  Indeed, because many of the OPM’s and MSPB’s duties would be transferred to the 
AOC, federal administrative cost should remain approximately the same. See Krent & DuVall, 
supra note 55, at 42 (discussing possible increased administrative costs that may arise from 
creating a new independent agency to oversee ALJs). Likewise, the direct judicial decision 
concerning ALJ discipline and removal—instead of judicial review of administrative action—
should save administrative costs. 
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in “Courts of Law.”234 The D.C. Circuit is a “Court[] of Law,”235 and 
thus the Clause’s text expressly permits the D.C. Circuit to appoint 
ALJs. 
Even if ALJs are instead employees, appointments by the D.C. 
Circuit should not offend the Constitution. The Supreme Court has 
been clear that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the 
appointment of employees and has thus suggested that Congress has 
wide latitude in deciding how employees are selected.236 Although 
Congress’s power to create interbranch-employee appointments is 
unresolved and has been rarely considered,237 Congress can likely 
create such appointments, subject at most to the same separation-of-
powers concerns surrounding interbranch-officer appointments.238 
After all, even Congress’s enumerated and plenary power to create an 
administrative bureaucracy does not permit Congress to act in ways 
that trample upon the separation of powers.239 Courts can respect the 
 
 234.  U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 235.  See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 888–89 (1991) (holding that “Courts of Law” refer 
to legislative and Article III courts); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678–80 (1988) (assuming 
that Special Division, comprised of Article III judges, was a “Court of Law”); Rice v. Ames, 180 
U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (holding that Congress could, under the Appointments Clause, vest 
appointment in “the [d]istrict or [c]ircuit courts”). 
 236.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (“If we . . . conclude that a special trial judge is only an 
employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser functionaries’ need not be selected in 
compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”). 
 237.  I have uncovered only two papers that have, in limited fashion, discussed the topic. See 
Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
277, 288–89 (2010); Emily E. Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of Powers: 
Are Internal Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
595, 613 (2007). I have uncovered no relevant judicial decisions. 
 238.  The fact that the Constitution provides express authority for only interbranch 
appointments of inferior officers, but not employees, should not be troubling. The Excepting 
Clause empowers and limits Congress. It allows Congress to use more efficient officer-
appointment mechanisms, but it requires Congress to appoint officers in a manner expressly 
stated in the Appointments Clause. Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673–75, with Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133–36 (1976) (per curiam). The Necessary and Proper Clause should provide 
Congress all the authority that it needs to create interbranch-employee appointments when 
establishing the administrative state. The separation of powers (but not the Appointments 
Clause) provides the proper boundary for those appointments. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135–36 
(explaining that Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit Congress to ignore other 
constitutional limitations). The separation-of-powers concerns should be very similar, if not 
identical, for employee and inferior-officer appointments. In both instances, Congress cannot 
impair the central functioning of the judicial or executive branch by giving the former the 
appointment power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.  
 239.  See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155–56 (2010) (stating that 
Congress must account for presidential oversight in creating a “vast and varied federal 
bureaucracy”); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 316 (2002) (“Congress’s 
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separation of powers in evaluating employee-selection schemes in the 
same manner as they do in assessing inferior-officer appointments—
that is, by considering the appointment method’s effect on both 
judicial and executive integrity, as discussed in Part IV.B.2. 
Accordingly, whether ALJs are ultimately deemed employees or 
officers, Congress’s interbranch-appointment powers should be 
equivalent, and the courts’ inquiry should account for the same 
underlying concerns. 
2. Doctrinal Incongruity Limitations 
Despite the fact that the Appointments Clause does not appear 
to forbid interbranch appointments, the Supreme Court has imposed 
limits on their use. After a false start in the mid-1800s, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that Congress has substantial discretion in 
creating interbranch appointments, so long as the appointment is 
neither incongruous nor offensive to the separation of powers. But, as 
I discuss below, this “incongruity” limitation is ill defined and 
partially redundant. 
In 1839, the Court in Ex Parte Hennen appeared to condemn 
interbranch appointments. There, the Court upheld a district court’s 
appointment of a court clerk.240 Although the case did not involve an 
interbranch appointment, the Court stated that “[t]he appointing 
power . . . was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department of 
the government to which the officer to be appointed most 
appropriately belonged.”241 
Forty years later, the Court substantially limited Hennen’s 
dictum. In Ex Parte Siebold, the Court upheld the judiciary’s 
interbranch appointment of election supervisors.242 Although the 
Court referred to Hennen in observing that “[i]t is no doubt usual and 
proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department 
of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular executive 
department to which the duties of such officers appertain,” the Court 
also declared that “there is no absolute requirement to this effect in 
the Constitution; and, if there were, it would be difficult in many cases 
 
powers are explicitly enumerated, and its powers are further limited through the separation of 
powers into three federal branches.”). 
 240.  38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 261–62 (1839). 
 241.  Id. at 257–58. Professor Amar has endorsed the Ex Parte Hennen view, arguing that if 
the Founders had sought to permit interbranch appointments, one would have expected 
“considerably more discussion” on the topic. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 808 (1999).  
 242.  100 U.S. 371, 398–99 (1879). 
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to determine to which department an office properly belonged.”243 As a 
result, the locus of power to appoint inferior officers rests “in the 
discretion of Congress,”244 thereby preventing “endless 
controversies.”245 
Although recognizing Congress’s interbranch-appointment 
power, the Supreme Court limited that power by advancing an 
ambiguous incongruity principle. The Court first noted that courts in 
past cases had properly refused to issue advisory administrative 
decisions concerning veterans’ benefits and claims against the U.S. 
Army in Florida.246 The Court then stated: 
[I]n in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the 
courts from [appointing inferior officers]. It cannot be affirmed that the appointment of 
the officers in question could, with any greater propriety, and certainly not with equal 
regard to convenience, have been assigned to any other depositary of official power 
capable of exercising it. Neither the President, nor any head of department, could have 
been equally competent to the task.247 
The Court appears to have meant that an interbranch 
appointment will be proper as long as the party defending the 
appointment demonstrates that the appointment would (1) not 
interfere with the judicial branch’s key function to resolve cases under 
Article III and (2) not rest more appropriately in the executive branch 
based on some function of propriety, competence, and convenience.248 
Siebold’s ambiguity was not lost on scholars or courts. Some 
observers suggested that the decision should be limited to the 
appointment of congressional-election officers (over which Congress 
has distinct powers under Article I)249 or to instances in which the 
 
 243.  Id. at 397; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 912–14 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-
judge panel) (saying in dicta that Siebold contradicts an understanding of Hennen that 
proscribes interbranch appointments). 
 244.  Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Perhaps the Court intended a narrower limiting principle. The Court speaks of “such 
incongruity.” Id. To what does “such” refer? The Court had not previously referred to 
“incongruity” in its preceding discussion, but it had referred to the courts’ proper refusal to 
provide advisory administrative opinions to the executive branch. Id. The Court then stated that 
it had a constitutional duty to appoint inferior officers “when required thereto by law,” and that 
“there is no such incongruity in the duty [to appoint.]” Id. Yet if the Court were merely 
suggesting that incongruity existed only when the Court was assigned a function that the 
Constitution forbade (such as providing advisory opinions), then it is unclear why the Court went 
on to discuss the propriety, efficiency, and competency of the appointment. 
 249.  See Wiener, supra note 133, at 425–26. 
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President’s central powers were not at issue.250 But others concluded 
that Siebold imposed only minor constraints on interbranch 
appointments. For instance, a three-judge district court stated in dicta 
that the incongruity inquiry does not create “an affirmative 
requirement that the duty of the officer be related to the 
administration of justice. It is a negative requirement that the duty 
may not have ‘such incongruity’ with the judicial function as would 
void the power sought to be conferred.”251 
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court rejected an 
incongruity-based attack but otherwise failed to clarify the doctrine’s 
dimensions.252 There, the Court upheld the ability of the Special 
Division (a specialized Article III court comprised of Article III judges) 
to appoint an independent prosecutor.253 In doing so, the Court held 
that Congress had the power to create interbranch appointments, 
subject to separation-of-powers and incongruity concerns mentioned in 
Siebold.254 The Court suggested that problems would arise if (1) “such 
[appointment] had the potential to impair the constitutional functions 
assigned to one of the branches,” and (2) incongruity exists between 
the courts’ normal functions and their duty to appoint.255 Under this 
partially redundant two-part inquiry (because each part looks to the 
courts’ functioning), the interbranch appointment of independent 
counsel was deemed not incongruous. The Court had earlier permitted 
the courts to appoint prosecutors,256 Congress sought to resolve “the 
conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the Executive 
Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers,”257 
and Congress had rendered the appointing judges ineligible to 
 
 250.  See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“We think it must be incongruous if an officer of one branch is 
authorized to appoint an officer of another branch who is assigned a duty central to the 
constitutional role of that other branch.”); cf. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional 
Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1159 (1988) 
(contending that Morrison rejected the understanding of the majority in In re Sealed Case). 
 251.  Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 914 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge panel). Judge 
Wright, in dissent, took a more expansive view of the incongruity limitation. He disapproved of 
the judicial appointments of board-of-education members because such extrajudicial activities 
are an “unwanted diversion from what ought to be the judge’s exclusive focus and commitment: 
deciding cases.” Id. at 923 (Wright, J., dissenting).  
 252.  487 U.S. 654, 659–734 (1988). 
 253.  See id. 
 254.  See id. at 673–76. 
 255.  Id. at 676. 
 256.  See id. 
 257.  Id. at 677. 
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participate in matters concerning the independent counsel.258 Of 
significance for present purposes, the Court’s analysis did not stop 
there. It went on to reject an argument that the entire statutory 
scheme, including its appointment provision, violated the separation 
of powers.259 Morrison is the Court’s last word on interbranch 
appointments.260 
3. Refining Incongruity Limitations 
To bring the Court’s interbranch-appointment-power analysis 
into sharper focus, I propose ordering it into three steps. As explained 
below, these steps are consistent with interbranch-appointment 
decisions and combine Morrison’s overlapping separation-of-powers 
and incongruity inquiries into one “incongruity analysis.” The first 
step requires determining whether a significant reason for the 
interbranch appointment exists. The second step considers whether 
the interbranch appointment impedes the central functioning of the 
appointing branch, usually the judiciary. And the third step considers 
whether the appointment impedes the central function of the 
competing branch, usually the executive branch. 
The first step asks whether Congress has a significant 
justification to create an interbranch appointment, such as 
minimizing conflicts of interest in the appointment of a prosecutor to 
investigate the executive branch’s high-ranking members.261 This 
justification recognizes the Court’s long-standing appreciation for 
functional concerns that lead Congress to implement interbranch 
appointments.262 At the same time, this inquiry can help to ensure 
 
 258.  See id. 
 259.  See id. at 685–96. 
 260.  See Samahon, supra note 54, at 258–66. Professor Tuan Samahon has argued that if 
the Court’s decision in Edmond v. United States overruled Morrison’s test for determining who 
are inferior officers, “[i]t precludes interbranch appointments pursuant to the Excepting Clause” 
because usually officers are subordinate to those who appoint them. See id. at 267. Samahon 
recognizes, however, that lower courts have continued to reconcile Edmond and Morrison. See id. 
at 258–64. Moreover, lower courts since Edmond have affirmed Congress’s power to create 
interbranch appointments. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Moreau, CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008). 
 261.  See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. Another significant justification, as mentioned in Ex 
Parte Siebold, is that difficulty of telling whether a certain inferior officer rests within a 
particular branch. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879). But such ambiguity, while 
sufficient, is not necessary because federal courts have upheld the interbranch appointments of 
U.S. Attorneys and independent counsel, who are plainly executive officers. 
 262.  See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (considering Congress’s interest in intrabranch conflicts 
of interest); Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (considering convenience of interbranch appointment and 
the appointing branch’s competence to appoint). 
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that Congress is not unnecessarily deviating from the general “law or 
rule” in Hennen and Siebold that Congress should vest the 
appointment of an inferior officer within the “department of 
government to which the official to be appointed most appropriately 
belonged.”263 For instance, Congress would not appear to have a 
significant reason for permitting courts to appoint deputy agency 
heads because they are policymakers for which no conflicts of interest 
are readily apparent. 
A significant justification, however, does not mean a 
necessity.264 Such a strict requirement would deprive Congress of the 
substantial discretion it has to decide how the appointment power 
should be distributed “as [it] think[s] proper” under the Excepting 
Clause.265 Indeed, if necessity were required, then the Court should 
not have approved the interbranch appointments of commissioners in 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,266 prosecutors in contempt 
proceedings in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,267 or 
election supervisors in Siebold.268 In short, requiring necessity would 
substantially limit Congress’s discretion that the Constitution 
expressly grants. Asking whether a significant reason undergirds an 
interbranch appointment, along with the other two steps, should 
ensure that Congress uses its interbranch-appointment-vesting 
discretion thoughtfully, not as a weapon to wound one of the other 
branches or to aggrandize its own power. Although the “significant 
justification” inquiry admittedly suffers from indefiniteness,269 
 
 263.  Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (quoting Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839)). 
In a decision concerning only the separation-of-powers context (and not appointments), the Court 
spoke similarly, refusing to permit “the Judicial Branch . . . [to] be assigned [or] allowed ‘tasks 
that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches.’ ” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 383 (1989).  
 264.  See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (rejecting any necessity requirement). But see 
Wiener, supra note 133, at 432 (suggesting that interbranch appointment of independent counsel 
was permissible because “[t]he raison d’être of the Independent Counsel was to create an officer 
not appointed by the executive branch”). 
 265.  See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (highlighting Congress’s broad direction to vest 
appointment power under the Excepting Clause). 
 266.  282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931). 
 267.  481 U.S. 787, 800 (1987). 
 268.  Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397. 
 269.  See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should create a methodology to 
provide guidance on which purposes will be deemed “compelling” or “important” in tiered-
scrutiny analysis). I have purposefully not used the terms “compelling,” “important,” or 
“legitimate” to describe the adequate justification; the incongruity analysis might 
unintentionally acquire the patina of the Court’s tiered-scrutiny, equal-protection analysis. See 
id. at 306. 
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limiting acceptable justifications for interbranch appointments to 
mitigating structural concerns (such as with ALJs) or ambiguities over 
the branch to which an inferior officer should be assigned (such as 
with federal marshals) is a reasonable place to start. A significant-
justification inquiry strikes the appropriate balance of respecting 
Congress’s prerogative while ensuring that Congress does not abuse 
its discretion.270 
The second and third steps relate to one another and ask 
whether the interbranch appointment undermines the central 
functioning of either the judicial or executive branches.271 In Morrison, 
the Court posed the question whether the interbranch appointment 
has the “potential to impair the constitutional functions assigned to 
one of the branches.”272 This seemingly general separation-of-powers 
inquiry has a specialized cast in the interbranch-appointment context, 
which generally concerns the relationship between the judicial and 
executive branches.273 
 
 270.  Compare United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It is not for the 
courts to determine the best or most efficient repository for a power of appointment vis-à-vis 
inferior officers. . . . Congress’s choice always deserves appreciable deference.”) (citing Siebold, 
100 U.S. at 397–98), and Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *37 (stating that the Constitution grants 
Congress “considerable discretion”), with Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) 
(suggesting that Congress is entitled to less deference when an interbranch appointment is at 
issue), and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison 
Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 421–23, 476–78 (1997) (arguing that redistributions of 
powers between the judicial branch and the other branches, as opposed to redistributions 
between the executive and legislative branches, are more suspect because judges are not 
politically accountable). Notably, Congress has not appeared to abuse its interbranch-
appointment authority. Congress currently permits only one interbranch appointment: the 
district courts’ appointment of U.S. Attorneys in very limited circumstances. See Moreau, 2008 
WL 4104131, at *8 (quoting Wiener, supra note 133, at 363). 
 271.  Many have criticized the central or “core executive” function inquiry from Morrison. 
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 559–60 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel 
Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 105–07 (1988). My purpose here is not to propose an inquiry that is 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent; my goal is merely to refine it. Those who do not approve of 
Morrison’s formulation should rest easy with its application here. The Supreme Court has, so far, 
not again uttered or applied the standard, including in Free Enterprise Fund, suggesting that the 
Morrison standard, if not abrogated, may be best understood as limited to the interbranch-
appointment context.  
 272.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677; see also id. at 684 (asking whether the Ethics in 
Government Act threatens “the ‘impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims within 
the judicial power of the United States’ ” (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986))). 
 273.  Other interbranch-appointment combinations are possible. For instance, the judiciary 
appoints (and removes) Article I bankruptcy judges, who are members of the legislative branch. 
See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2626–27 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the 
interbranch nature of the appointment may be less troubling because the legislature cannot 
appoint under the Appointments Clause. 
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This inquiry ensures that, even with a significant purpose, an 
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of 
the executive or judicial branches. After all if an interbranch 
appointment, whatever its purposes, greatly impedes one of the 
affected branches, the appointment may be unsuitable. For instance, 
after the scandal concerning the forced resignations and removals of 
U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush Administration,274 
Congress could decide that the courts, rather than the executive 
branch, would be better stewards of the appointment and removal 
powers concerning these “ministers of justice.” Despite Congress’s 
attempt to remedy a potentially serious structural problem, 
transferring to the courts the full-time duty to appoint and remove 
U.S. Attorneys would likely impede the central functioning of the 
executive branch—to set prosecutorial policy throughout the country—
by hindering presidential control over an important executive function 
in all districts in the United States. And the U.S. Attorneys’ 
appointment and removal by the courts could impede the central 
functioning of the judicial branch by bogging it down in ongoing 
political battles over law-enforcement policies and personnel. 
Although the existing, default appointment and removal scheme for 
U.S. Attorneys may present structural challenges, an interbranch 
appointment would likely be more problematic by impeding the 
central functioning of two branches. In other words, these final steps 
ensure that Congress doesn’t choose a cure that is worse than the 
disease. 
By engaging in this three-part inquiry, courts can simplify the 
currently amorphous and redundant separation-of-powers and 
incongruity analyses. The Court’s interbranch-appointment and 
separation-of-powers analyses consider both the appointing and the 
affected branches, but in confusing and redundant ways.275 My 
 
 274.  See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales: “Mistakes Were Made,” WASH. POST (Mar. 
14, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300776 
_pf.html. 
 275.  See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676. The Court’s separation of powers inquiry is at least 
partially redundant with the interbranch-appointment inquiry. The latter considers the effect of 
the appointment on both the appointing and nonappointing branches, and the former considers 
the effect of an appointment on either the nonappointing branch or both the nonappointing and 
appointing branches. Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675 (referring to separation of powers as an 
“addition[al]” issue to incongruity and suggesting that separation of powers focuses only on the 
nonappointing branch), with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385, 389 (1989) 
(considering both the affected branch and the appointing branch for its separation-of-powers 
analysis). Thus, under either separation-of-powers formulation, the two inquiries overlap at least 
in part. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 436 & n.338; see also United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-
0388, 2008 WL 4104131, at *17 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008). 
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proposed three-part inquiry, following recent lower-court opinions, 
avoids these problems by considering the effect on both branches as 
part of a compressed incongruity analysis.276 
C. Propriety of Interbranch Appointments of ALJs 
Interbranch appointments of ALJs should be deemed proper 
under the refined incongruity limits. Not only does a significant 
reason for the interbranch appointment of ALJs exist, but the D.C. 
Circuit’s appointments of them will not impede the central functioning 
of either the judiciary or the executive branch. 
1. Significant Purpose for Interbranch Appointment of ALJs 
As to the first of the three inquiries, a significant justification 
supports the interbranch appointment of ALJs: the resolution or 
mitigation of the ALJ separation-of-powers quandary. Vesting the 
D.C. Circuit with the power to appoint ALJs remedies the existing 
Appointments Clause problem by channeling ALJ appointments, in 
keeping with its text, to “Courts of Law.”277 And an interbranch 
appointment remedies, in perhaps an unconventional way, the 
existing concerns as to the proper balance of executive supervision and 
ALJ impartiality. 
a. Mitigating Presidential-Control Concerns 
With the appointment power in the D.C. Circuit’s hands, the 
President loses any constitutional power he may have had to remove 
ALJs. This counterintuitive effect arises because the power to remove 
is incident to the power to appoint, unless Congress has placed the 
removal power elsewhere.278 Courts have consistently applied this 
 
 276.  See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 26–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting challenge to 
judicial appointment of U.S. Attorneys in a combined incongruity and separation-of-powers 
analysis); see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, R.B., J., 
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“An inter-branch 
appointment would indeed fail the test of congruity if it violated the separation of powers 
doctrine.”).  
 277.  Resolving an appointments concern alone is not a significant reason for an interbranch 
appointment. Were it otherwise, Congress’s power to create interbranch appointments would be 
essentially unlimited. 
 278.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010); Burnap v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to remove is, in the absence of statutory provision 
to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint.”); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259–
60 (1839) (noting that officers serve at the discretion of the appointing power). 
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principle in the intrabranch-appointment context, albeit without 
significant discussion of the interbranch nature of the appointment 
and principally in the context of interbranch appointments of Article I 
or Article IV inferior officers.279 And, indeed, the judiciary currently 
has the incidental, interbranch-removal power over Article I 
bankruptcy judges.280 To be sure, in the context of judicial interbranch 
appointments of Article II inferior officers, courts have stressed the 
executive branch’s ability to remove prosecutors whom courts had 
appointed.281 But courts have never held that the executive branch 
must have the power to remove those officials, much less have the 
same kind of supervisory power over officials who exercise only 
impartial, adjudicatory powers.282 
Nor should courts impose any such limit by relying on Free 
Enterprise Fund. If the President or agency head permissibly lacks 
removal power, Free Enterprise Fund’s ambiguous limitation on 
tiered-tenure protections becomes inapposite by its own terms. That 
decision invalidated one of two tenure protections that limited the 
executive branch’s implied removal power. Here, only one tier of 
tenure protection exists between the D.C. Circuit and ALJs, leaving 
 
 279.  See Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424 (1901) (considering commissioners (i.e., 
justices of the peace in Indian Territory) appointed by judges); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 
902, 913 n.13 (D.D.C. 1967) (citing In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257–58 (1839)) 
(considering appointment of D.C. school-board members); cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 & n.2 (1931) (upholding interbranch appointment of commissioners, 
with mostly judicial and some executive functions, and indicating that they were subordinate to 
appointing judges). The court likewise suggested the same incidental removal power exists with 
the appointment of executive-branch inferior officers, such as perhaps ALJs. Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 126 (1926) (“[T]he power of appointment to executive office carries with it, as 
a necessary incident, the power of removal.” (emphasis added)); see id. at 161 (same for “inferior 
executive officers”). 
 280.  See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006). To be precise, Congress has authorized the Judicial 
Councils—composed of Article III district and circuit judges—within each circuit to remove 
bankruptcy judges. The circuit courts themselves have only the appointment power under § 152. 
 281.  See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988) (deciding whether judicial 
power to remove an executive officer infringed upon the executive branch); Hilario, 218 F.3d at 
27 (noting judges cannot remove interim United States Attorneys they appoint); United States v. 
Moreau, CR 07-0388, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (same). 
 282.  Although Morrison relied upon the Attorney General’s “most important[]” removal 
authority over independent counsel, see 487 U.S. at 696, the Court never said that such power 
was required. Professor Krent argues that Morrison determined that “some form of removal 
authority was constitutionally required.” Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: 
The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2436 (2011) (referring to 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96). His inference is reasonable but not compelled. In light of the 
Court’s consistent treatment of the removal power as incident to the appointment power and the 
meaningfully different functions of various inferior officers, a more limited interpretation of 
Morrison makes more sense if, as I attempt to do here, one seeks to reconcile the Court’s 
Appointments Clause jurisprudence.  
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the President no implied removal power. Thus Free Enterprise’s 
holding does not apply. Vesting the removal power within the D.C. 
Circuit is a constitutional means of avoiding Free Enterprise Fund’s 
holding that applies to tiered-tenure protections within the executive 
branch.283 
Even if Free Enterprise Fund is understood to stand more 
broadly for strongly endorsing or generally requiring the President’s 
power to remove executive officers, the rationale in Free Enterprise 
Fund does not extend to ALJs. The Court stated that the removal 
power ensures that the President has the power to supervise 
unelected subordinates, not merely to persuade them “to do what they 
ought to do without persuasion.”284 But, when the government is a 
party to what is meant to be an impartial formal proceeding, the ALJ, 
as an impartial decisionmaker, should not decide in the government’s 
favor unless the government persuades it to do so. A contrary result—
that the President can obtain a desired result from an ALJ without 
persuasion—would lead to significant due process concerns and 
undermine the very purpose of ALJs. In fact, the Court in Wiener v. 
United States upheld implicit limits on the President’s removal power 
over adjudicators by relying on Congress’s ability to render 
adjudicators “entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct 
or indirect”285 and, as the Court said that it took for granted, the 
President’s inability to interfere with any specific adjudication.286 In 
short, although the President may not have to persuade an agency to 
implement a certain policy, he (or an agency) must do just that—
under the APA and under the U.S. Constitution—during formal 
administrative adjudication. The Court’s doctrine supports this 
normative view grounded in due process. Whereas removal may be a 
 
 283.  ALJs do not morph into principal officers if the D.C. Circuit, as opposed to an agency 
head, can remove them. The Court in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997), said, 
“ ‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others 
who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The 
judges of the D.C. Circuit, who received presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation, can 
remove ALJs under limited circumstances. And agency heads, who (in probably every case) were 
also similarly nominated and confirmed, can reverse ALJs’ decisions as to fact and law. Cf. 
Amar, supra note 241, at 807 (contending that subordination, not removability, is the relevant 
inquiry for inferior-officer status). The court’s significant, but limited, removal power and agency 
heads’ substantial supervision over ALJ decisionmaking would render ALJs no more than 
inferior officers.  
 284.  Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010).  
 285.  Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). 
 286.  Id. at 356. 
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necessary tool for presidential supervision over policymakers,287 it 
should not be necessary for presidential supervision of impartial 
adjudicators appointed by another branch.288  
Finally, the lack of one form of presidential control—the 
removal power—should not be troubling, given the other forms of 
executive supervision and direction.289 The executive branch, after all, 
retains a prominent place in the removal decisionmaking process 
because agencies can initiate ALJ-removal proceedings. Thus, unlike 
the proposal that granted ALJs Article III protections, my proposal 
does not suffer the infirmity of completely denuding the executive 
branch from the removal of an executive officer. As explained in Part 
IV.E, the President retains tools aside from initiating removal 
proceedings to have sufficient supervisory authority over ALJs’ policy 
decisions.290 
b. Mitigating Impartiality Concerns 
Judicial appointment and removal cures or mitigates the ALJ 
impartiality concerns, including the concerns that arise from 
Caperton. Because the agency is no longer “choos[ing] the judge in [its] 
 
 287.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159 (“The Commission cannot wield a free hand to 
supervise individual members if it must destroy the Board in order to fix it.”).  
 288.  But see Jeffrey A. Wertkin, A Return to First Principles: Rethinking ALJ Compromises, 
22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 365, 401 (2002) (stating prior to Free Enterprise Fund that 
“after-the-fact correction of a single decision supplies insufficient control”). I distinguish between 
those that perform only adjudicative functions, such as ALJs, and those who sometimes (or, at 
least, are permitted to) promulgate rules, such as agency heads. An interbranch appointment 
and an incidental removal of policymakers create more troubling separation-of-powers concerns 
for both the executive and judicial branches. See infra Part IV.D–E. 
 289.  Professor Jonathan Entin has concluded that the removal power has limited actual 
significance, but its rhetoric and the Court’s holdings have significant symbolic consequences. 
Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1595, 1602–03 (1997). Perhaps, then, the Court’s formal focus on the removal power, 
as opposed to other forms of administrative control or independence, has assumed inflated 
importance. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (arguing that scholars should focus on 
practical limitations on agency independence). A functional approach to executive control that 
looks beyond the removal power makes the most sense in cases, such as with ALJs, where the 
removal power creates other constitutional tensions.  
 290.  My proposal may not satisfy unitary executive theorists because the President cannot 
remove ALJs. But those theorists’ dissatisfaction would transcend my particular proposal and 
extend to the Court’s removal-powers doctrine and any limits arising from due process. This 
doctrine has already tacitly approved of the interbranch-removal power, see supra note 279, and 
significantly limited presidential removal power, see generally Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 
3138. My purpose here is to provide a workable solution that accounts for both normative and 
doctrinal problems, not to challenge or provide a new normative theory of the President’s 
supervisory powers.  
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own cause,”291 any “probability of unfairness”292 or “unconstitutional 
‘potential for bias’ ” should not exist under Caperton’s standard.293 The 
D.C. Circuit can also help ensure that the ALJs have a broad array of 
experiences within and outside the agency and thereby reduce the 
likelihood that ALJs come from the farm team that is the agency’s 
enforcement division with undue sympathy for agency-enforcement, 
especially highly partisan policy, positions. The D.C. Circuit, with 
careful consideration of an agency’s needs, will likely be more 
concerned than a selecting agency with indicia of a candidate’s 
impartiality. As with the transfer of removal power to the D.C. 
Circuit, the transfer of appointing power enhances, at the very least, 
the perception of fairness. And, as Caperton makes clear, perceptions 
concerning impartiality matter.294 
Likewise, by placing the removal decision in another branch, 
those appearing before ALJs will feel more confident that the 
executive branch—whether in the form of the President, the agency, 
or any other executive actor—is not directing the actions of a 
marionette ALJ, especially in cases in which credibility is key and an 
ALJ’s decision receives increased deference.295 That the President’s 
and agency’s actual removal power is currently very limited is largely 
beside the point. The perception that the President and agency have 
more control over ALJs than impartial courts is a powerful force that 
creates the appearance of unfairness that appears to drive, as 
Caperton makes clear, the Supreme Court’s due process inquiry. 
Vesting the removal power in the D.C. Circuit largely mitigates the 
appearance of improper agency control over ALJs.296 
In short, an interbranch-appointment mechanism serves a 
significant purpose: it resolves, or at least substantially mitigates, the 
appointment, removal, and impartiality concerns that now surround 
 
 291.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).  
 292.  Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 
(1955)). 
 293.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66 
(1971)). 
 294.  See id. at 888–89 (noting that state recusal requirements for appearance of impropriety 
will limit due process challenges). 
 295.  See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 29–33 (explaining agency’s deference to ALJ 
credibility determinations); Timony, supra note 2, at 811–12 & nn.28–29 (same); supra notes 49–
50 and accompanying text (same). 
 296.  This Article does not consider whether, aside from impartiality, the ability of the 
executive branch to overrule an ALJ decision creates a due process problem. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (instructing lower 
courts to defer to agency, as opposed to ALJ, decisions), strongly suggests not. 
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ALJs. And it does so better than other appointment solutions under 
the Excepting Clause by way of a simple transfer of duties. For 
instance, if the President alone or a nonindependent executive 
department appointed and removed ALJs, the ALJ would have only 
one tier of tenure protection, and that good cause tenure protection 
would provide the removing executive party with significant 
discretion.297 Vesting the same powers in a new or current 
independent department (whose members, because of their 
independence, the President could remove only for cause) would then, 
as now, leave the President’s removal power in jeopardy because two 
tiers of tenure protection would exist between the President and the 
ALJs. The competing concerns underlying ALJs’ place in the federal 
bureaucracy render an interbranch appointment appropriate and 
demonstrate that the executive branch is not an equally, much less a 
more, appropriate repository of the appointment (and thus the 
incidental removal) power.298 
2. Judicious Appointments 
Congress can use an interbranch appointment to end ALJs’ 
separation-of-powers quandary without impeding the central 
functioning of the judicial branch. Article II expressly gives the courts 
of law, if they have Congress’s blessing, the power to appoint inferior 
officers.299 The courts routinely appoint officials with solely 
adjudicatory powers—magistrate judges, special masters, and 
bankruptcy judges, for instance.300 Indeed, the courts of appeals 
themselves appoint (and have the power to remove) bankruptcy judges 
for their respective circuits, and this appointment qualifies as 
 
 297.  The default appointment mechanism of nomination and confirmation would likely 
provide ALJs additional authority within the federal bureaucracy. See Nina A. Mendelson, 
Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2455, 2478 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of Senate-confirmed appointments to agency 
authority). But such an appointment for ALJs would leave the removal power with the 
President, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 162 (1926) (recognizing the President’s 
incidental removal power), and thus not eradicate impartiality concerns. Thus, even if Congress 
could only use an interbranch appointment when a default appointment was less suitable, an 
interbranch appointment for ALJs would be permissible because it provides a more 
comprehensive remedy for concerns surrounding ALJs. Moreover, traditional appointment of 
sixteen hundred ALJs would be an onerous mode of appointment. 
 298.  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (explaining that the court 
should not perform tasks better suited to other branches); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 
(1879) (explaining the court’s appointment power under Article II). 
 299.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 300.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 631 (2006) (authorizing court appointment of bankruptcy and 
magistrate judges, respectively). 
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interbranch because bankruptcy judges are Article I judges.301 ALJs 
also adjudicate, albeit in cases in which their decisions advance the 
policies of an agency, as opposed to those of Congress, the federal 
common law, or the Constitution.302 Accordingly, granting the D.C. 
Circuit power to appoint adjudicators generally, by itself, almost 
certainly does not impede the central functioning of the judicial 
branch—that is, to decide disputes. 
ALJs’ status as executive, as opposed to judicial, officers does 
not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court has never invalidated an 
interbranch appointment; therefore, which appointments are 
inappropriate is generally unknown. But one recognized possibility is 
that an interbranch appointment is inappropriate when it “thrust[s] 
courts into partisan, political battles.”303 Whatever fears may exist 
when the judiciary appoints independent counsel, interim U.S. 
Attorneys, or other executive inferior officers should be absent for 
judicial appointment of ALJs. ALJs are meant to be neutrals who do 
not create or advocate particular policies, much less those identified 
with certain political parties. Indeed, if ALJ selection is currently 
partisan, vesting the appointment power in the D.C. Circuit should 
mitigate the partisanship because the D.C. Circuit, like other courts, 
routinely selects impartial adjudicators from a candidate pool. 
Because agencies themselves continue to have the power to set policy, 
the courts would not select policymakers. Instead, they would appoint 
those who have a duty to find facts and apply the agency’s regulations 
and organic acts to disputes before them. This is, at the very least, a 
quasi-judicial function that judges understand and can determine with 
no less competence than agencies.304 
 
 301.  See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (conferring authority on U.S. courts of appeals to appoint 
bankruptcy judges); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) (holding that bankruptcy 
courts are not “adjuncts of Article III courts”); id. at 2624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). 
 302.  See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (stating that ALJs were 
“functionally comparable” to judges); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1209 (noting that ALJs do not 
overrule the actions of the two elected branches). 
 303.  Wiener, supra note 133, at 426; see Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (arguing that 
appointment of independent counsel “risks politicizing the judiciary”); Wiener, supra note 133, at 
430–31 (arguing against the judicial appointment of U.S. Attorneys for this reason). But compare 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“We do not believe . . . that the significantly 
political nature of the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission’s work renders unconstitutional its 
placement within the Judicial Branch.”), with id. at 396 (“Nor do the [Sentencing] Guidelines . . . 
involve a degree of political authority inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch.”). 
 304.  See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (“This is not a case in which judges are given power 
. . . in an area in which they have no special knowledge or expertise.” (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 676 n.13 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The D.C. Circuit’s ability to receive comments from interested 
parties helps assuage fears of partisanship and inadequate 
information.305 Controversy arose when a judge on the Special 
Division discussed who should serve as independent counsel in the 
Whitewater Matter with Republican senators.306 As Professor Ronald 
Krotoszynski has suggested, a public notice-and-comment period 
would allow judges to obtain advice from numerous interested parties 
without resorting to ex parte contacts that could easily create the 
appearance of partisan appointments.307 These comments would be 
much like amicus briefs with which the D.C. Circuit is all too familiar. 
Receiving comments—publicly filed briefs, of sorts, from interested 
persons—helps “maintain[] the dignity of Article III courts”308 by 
allowing them to decide in a manner that is both familiar and 
transparent. 
Likewise, ALJs’ status as executive officers does not 
meaningfully distinguish them from the other adjudicators (i.e., 
bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges) whom appellate courts 
currently appoint for purposes of the Exceptions Clause. Bankruptcy 
judges are Article I judges, and magistrates are Article III inferior 
officers. Unlike ALJs, who are executive officers, these other 
adjudicators cannot be reversed by the executive branch. But the 
executive branch’s ability to reverse an ALJ’s decision should not be 
troubling because that branch has the same or greater power over 
other executive officials occasionally appointed by the judiciary (such 
as U.S. Attorneys). 
The fact that ALJs, even if executive officers, are not also 
officers of an Article III court is relevant, but not dispositive. Courts 
have found it relevant, for instance, that prosecutors are not only 
executive officers, but also officers of the court.309 Yet, ALJs’ lack of a 
dual-officer capacity does not mean that interbranch appointment of 
 
 305.  See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (“Judges will not be good at picking prosecutors 
because they have inadequate information and weak incentives.”); Krent & DuVall, supra note 
55, at 42 (arguing that those outside of an ALJ’s agency lack familiarity with that agency’s 
“law”). 
 306.  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (mentioning the “partisan bickering” resulting 
from the judge’s meeting); Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 447–55 (discussing Starr’s 
appointment and subsequent challenge to Judge Sentelle’s ex parte meeting). 
 307.  Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 474. 
 308.  Id. at 475. 
 309.  See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing dual role of U.S. 
Attorneys as officers of the court); cf. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (describing dual 
role of federal marshals). But see United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 
4104131, at *38 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (“[An appointed U.S. Attorney] is not part of the judiciary, 
nor has he ever been.”). 
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ALJs is improper. Unlike prosecutors, who exercise purely executive 
functions (even when serving as officers of the court), ALJs exercise 
only adjudicative functions, and the courts routinely review their 
decisions. Courts’ and ALJs’ shared function gives the former the 
competence to appoint the latter. In other words, the ALJs’ similar 
function to courts more than compensates for ALJs’ lack of dual-officer 
status within two branches. 
Perhaps, however, appointing a large cadre of ALJs would 
require the D.C. Circuit to forsake its central function of deciding 
cases. After all, the appointment of an independent counsel, election 
supervisors, U.S. Attorneys, or even bankruptcy judges is a relatively 
rare event.310 In contrast, the federal administrative state has more 
than sixteen hundred ALJs. The large number of ALJs (almost double 
the 874 Article III judgeships311) creates the possibility that 
appointing ALJs, not deciding cases, will become a full-time job for the 
D.C. Circuit judges. 
Yet, Congress can mollify this legitimate concern. The average 
annual number of ALJ appointments will likely rest around fifty-
six,312 certainly more than other interbranch appointments, but still a 
manageable number. Congress can largely mitigate any burden on the 
D.C. Circuit by permitting it to appoint ALJs in three-judge panels.313 
Assuming that the Court has nine active judges (and may have up to 
eleven active judges),314 the Court could establish at least three panels 
for each year, with each panel appointing approximately nineteen 
 
 310.  For instance, the D.C. Circuit is charged with appointing only one bankruptcy judge to 
a fourteen-year term. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)–(2) (2006). Even the elephantine Ninth Circuit must 
appoint only sixty-eight bankruptcy judges to fourteen-year terms. See id. (listing the number of 
judges each individual district must appoint). And the district courts can appoint a U.S. Attorney 
only if political-appointment mechanisms have failed. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 366 
(explaining the appointment process).  
 311.  See Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/ 
FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (listing 874 total Article III judgeships). 
 312.  Although I was unable to find any statistics concerning the average ALJ tenure, the 
GAO has reported that “the ALJ program has experienced a low annual retirement rate, ranging 
from 2 to 5 percent from 2002 through 2006.” GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 13. For ease of 
discussion, I have estimated a retirement rate of 3.5 percent and applied that to the number of 
ALJs provided in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, rounded up to the nearest 
hundred (sixteen hundred). See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3213 app. C (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“According to data provided by the Office of Personnel Management, 
reprinted below, there are 1,584 administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Federal Government.”). 
 313.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (permitting three-judge panels to decide cases). 
 314.  28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (permitting eleven judges on the D.C. Circuit). For ease of discussion, 
I rely on the assumption that the D.C. Circuit will have at least nine active judges because the 
D.C. Circuit had nine judges during the time period relevant for the data underlying the 2010 
judge-to-decision ratio.  
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ALJs per year (or fewer if senior judges are permitted and willing to 
assist their active colleagues on additional panels).315 If each 
appointment is treated like a decision on the merits by each judge on 
the panel (meaning that each appointment is weighed more heavily 
than decisions on the merits because each appointment “counts” three 
times, one for each judge), participating in nineteen appointment 
decisions increases each active D.C. Circuit judge’s judge-to-merits-
decision ratio, based on data from 2010, from 1:173 to 1:192. This ratio 
is still significantly below the same ratio for other courts with 
relatively light caseloads (e.g., 1:242 for the Tenth Circuit, 1:293 for 
the Sixth Circuit, 1:319 for the Seventh Circuit, and 1:415 for the First 
Circuit) and the national ratio of 1:459.316 Because the D.C. Circuit 
would continue to have the lightest caseload of all federal circuits even 
when appointing ALJs, any argument that the appointing of ALJs will 
improperly burden the D.C. Circuit “from accomplishing its 
constitutionally assigned functions”317 is difficult to accept. 
Even if one disagrees with my educated guess over the number 
of appointments or its burden on the D.C. Circuit, other remedies exist 
for managing the number of appointments. Perhaps if ALJs reduce 
their average tenure or if agencies need a greater number of ALJs, my 
suggested average annual number of fifty-six ALJ appointments may 
be too low. Or appointing ALJs may be unduly burdensome merely 
because appointing would now potentially constitute approximately 
eleven percent of each active D.C. Circuit judge’s duties or because the 
D.C. Circuit’s docket is more time consuming and complex than I 
expect. If these objections turn out to be well founded, relatively 
 
 315.  The D.C. Circuit has several senior judges. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS: D.C. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (click on “Judges” tab to see listing of 
judges). If three agreed to assist with ALJ appointments and thereby create a fourth panel, each 
panel would appoint approximately fourteen ALJs per year. 
 316.  See supra note 223 (documenting the caseloads of the U.S. Courts of Appeals). The AOC 
has released similar data from 2011, but this more recent data does not vary materially from the 
2010 data and thus does not alter my conclusions above. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial 
Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/ 
FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals_FCMS_Profiles_December_2011.pdf&page=3 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013). For instance, although the 2011 relevant ratio for the D.C. Circuit 
increases from 1:173 to 1:203 (based largely on the court having one fewer judge), the national 
ratio increases by an even greater degree from 1:459 to 1:496.  
 317.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). Similarly, the AOC’s assistance to the D.C. Circuit should not 
be problematic. The Supreme Court has already indicated its support of the AOC’s existence and 
“myriad responsibilities.” Id. at 388–89. Indeed, the AOC’s duties in administering the ALJ 
examination, compiling the agency and third-party comments, and otherwise assisting the D.C. 
Circuit ensure that the judges’ appointing of ALJs does not interfere with their central function 
of deciding cases. 
2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/23/2013 4:41 PM 
854 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:3:797 
 
simple solutions exist. Congress could allow three-judge panels within 
all of the federal circuit courts to appoint ALJs and rotate the 
appointing duty among the active judges of the circuits in random 
order, based on either each circuit’s caseload or the number of ALJs 
working within each circuit, as determined by the AOC. Although I 
have proposed turning to the D.C. Circuit based on its administrative 
law expertise, its location, and its light caseload, diluting the 
appointing burden throughout all of the federal circuit courts is 
another way of achieving the benefits of an interbranch appointment 
without improperly impeding the D.C. Circuit or other “Court of 
Law’s” judicial function.318 
Finally, that the D.C. Circuit may review the decisions from 
ALJs that they have appointed is a virtue, not a vice. Some litigants 
and scholars have argued that an interbranch appointment is 
improper when a court sits in judgment of decisions by those it 
appoints, such as prosecutors. The appointment becomes improper, 
the argument goes, because the judiciary forsakes its appearance of 
impartiality.319 But this argument proves too much. Judges decide or 
review cases in which they have selected, for instance, defense counsel 
for the indigent, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and special masters 
(all of whom could be the judges’ former law clerks) without 
impugning their impartiality.320 Therefore, it is difficult to see why 
their review of a decision by an ALJ—chosen for his or her ability to 
be impartial, not for particular policy preferences that the agency can 
reverse—would be problematic, especially when the APA requires the 
court to review the decision of the agency, not the ALJ.321 Indeed, the 
D.C. Circuit’s awareness that it may have to review decisions from the 
 
 318.  The appointing judges are not likely to identify themselves as managers or employers, 
as opposed to adjudicators (and thereby undermine their judicial function). No such 
identification has been alleged to occur, despite judicial appointment of numerous other officials, 
including prosecutors, public defenders, bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges, mediators, and 
various clerks of court.  
 319.  See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (conceding judicial 
appointment of prosecutors could adversely affect the court’s impartiality); United States v. 
Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (examining 
possibility that such appointments could diminish the integrity of the courts); Wiener, supra note 
133, at 431–32 (arguing judges lack impartiality and the prosecutors they appoint lack 
accountability). The Morrison Court also noted that the Special Division’s members lacked the 
ability to participate in any proceedings concerning the independent counsel that they had 
nominated. 487 U.S. 654, 683–84 (1988). But ALJs’ limited ability to make final policy 
determinations, nonpolitical role, and independence from the judiciary (which cannot set its 
jurisdiction or refer matters to the ALJ, as in Morrison) should mitigate any concern that may 
arise from the D.C. Circuit’s review of ALJ decisions. 
 320.  See, e.g., Hilario, 218 F.3d at 29 (referring to appointment of defense counsel). 
 321.  5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006). 
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ALJ may help provide the D.C. Circuit incentive to appoint the best 
candidates.322 
3. Improved Functioning of the Executive Branch 
Despite the executive branch’s loss of power to appoint and 
remove ALJs, interbranch appointment and removal do not impede 
that branch’s central functioning.323 First and foremost, agency heads 
continue to have the power to reverse an ALJ decision under the APA 
and thus control federal administrative policy.324 Agencies, too, 
continue to have discretion over matters concerning ALJs under my 
proposal. For instance, not only do they continue to decide the number 
of ALJs needed to carry out agency missions,325 but they also can 
comment on ALJ candidates and submit their own candidates for 
judicial consideration.326 Indeed, the proposed “Rule of Three or Four,” 
unlike the current “Rule of Three,” acts as a suitable substitute for 
selective certification by permitting the agency to ensure, especially if 
the “Veterans’ Preference” leads to three candidates without sufficient 
expertise, that at least one candidate has certain necessary 
 
 322.  See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (arguing that judges lack incentive to make excellent 
interbranch appointments). Admittedly, the possibility of the D.C. Circuit reviewing a particular 
ALJ’s decision is slight; the other circuits review numerous administrative orders. Yet, the D.C. 
Circuit is likely to be sufficiently considerate to its sister courts to try to appoint impartial, well-
trained ALJs.  
 323.  See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Morrison 
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (asking whether appointment undermines the President’s ability to 
make policy choices); see also Blumoff, supra note 250, at 1160–61: 
The requirement of some congruity also undermined the Sealed Case court’s ‘Chicken 
Little’ concern [that a limited incongruity principle would essentially permit the court 
to appoint all inferior officers if Congress sought to impede the executive’s 
prerogative] . . . . The Supreme Court noted that Congress could make no such 
delegation when the courts lacked special competence of the subject matter. 
 324.  5 U.S.C. § 557(b); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951). The 
Supreme Court in Bowsher stated that “[o]nce an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that 
can remove him . . . that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey.” Bowsher v. 
United States, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). This formulation is not entirely accurate in the 
interbranch-removal context of ALJs. ALJs will fear the D.C. Circuit judges, who can remove 
them under a heightened tenure-protection provision. But they must obey agency policies and 
general conceptions of impartial adjudication. Their refusal to do so would be relevant to any 
removal decision.  
 325.  See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (empowering agencies to appoint as many ALJs as necessary); see 
also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (considering Special Division’s inability to name 
independent counsel without AG’s request when approving of interbranch appointment of 
independent counsel). 
 326.  See supra Part IV.A (outlining the agency’s participation in selecting ALJs under this 
proposal). 
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experience.327 Agencies may also seek the nearly immediate removal of 
an ALJ, on a “fast track,” if the agency can establish “inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”328 And agencies can immediately 
remove an ALJ who presents a national-security risk.329 Such abilities 
provide ample agency supervision over ALJs and the smooth 
functioning of the executive branch. 
The transferred removal power from the executive branch to 
the D.C. Circuit—and thus the limited sharing of ALJ supervision 
between the two branches—should not trouble the executive branch 
because it has, as a practical matter, lost nothing. Its removal powers 
were already substantially limited. Currently, agencies cannot simply 
remove an ALJ. Instead, they must persuade an independent agency 
(the MSPB) to remove an ALJ.330 Likewise, under my proposal, the 
agency must continue to persuade an independent entity to remove an 
ALJ. Under both the current and the proposed removal schemes, the 
President and the agency lack the ability to decide the removal 
question and the ability to influence the MSPB’s or the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision directly because of each body’s protection from removal.331 
Both scenarios also provide ALJs a judicial forum. Although the 
current scenario provides deferential judicial review of the MSPB’s 
decision in the Federal Circuit,332 my proposal permits the agency to 
have speedier resolution of removal disputes because the D.C. Circuit 
decides the issue in the first instance. Moreover, even if the ALJs, as 
the lower-level officers in their tiered-tenure scheme, lost their tenure 
protection under a Free Enterprise Fund analysis,333 the MSPB would 
continue to have substantial tenure protection that would prevent 
direct presidential interference with the MSPB’s decision. At bottom, 
 
 327.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the “Veteran’s Preference” in ALJ 
qualification and related expertise problems under the current system). 
 328.  See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining the standard of removal for 
ALJs); infra note 337 and accompanying text (same). 
 329.  See supra note 231 and accompanying text (explaining immediate removal option). 
 330.  5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (establishing that removal of an ALJ is permissible “only for good 
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board”); id. § 1202(d) 
(shielding members of the MSPB from the President’s at-will removal). 
 331.  Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3171 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the analogous inability of the President to remove members of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board directly where the removal decision was vested in SEC 
commissioners who were themselves removable only for cause).  
 332.  See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387 nn.33 & 35 (1983) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703) 
(highlighting that “the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB”).  
 333.  Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (declaring unconstitutional the two tiers of tenure 
protection for PCAOB members). 
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agencies would simply petition a different, albeit perhaps more, 
independent body under my proposal. 
But at the same time, the proposed tenure-protection standard 
for ALJs seeks to strike the proper balance between ALJ impartiality 
and executive supervision. Although Congress intended to ensure ALJ 
impartiality with good cause tenure protection,334 the good cause 
standard has consistently been interpreted to permit removal of other 
federal officials based on insubordination.335 Such a standard 
suggests, contrary to congressional intent, that ALJs are required to 
follow agency heads’ direction on how to decide matters. Were it 
otherwise, the term “insubordination” would assume a different 
meaning for ALJs than for other federal officials, without any textual 
support for the distinction.336 The proposed “inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, and malfeasance” standard—the ubiquitous protection for 
federal adjudicators337—provides more specific grounds for removal 
than the good cause standard and thereby further constrains the 
removing party’s discretion.338 This proposed standard would not 
permit removal based on insubordination.339 But, happily for the 
executive branch, it makes clear that inefficiency is a proper ground 
for removal that, with proper judicial interpretation, should permit 
removal based on, say, an unjustified low number of decided cases (as 
 
 334.  See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131–32, 142 (1953) 
(“Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause 
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) 
after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof.”). 
 335.  See Nagel v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 707 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(citing Boyle v. United States, 515 F.2d 1397, 1402 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Burton v. United States, 404 
F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1968)); see also May v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. La. 
1963). 
 336.  See Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 330–31 & n.11 (1984) (suggesting 
that insubordination was a proper ground for removal of ALJs, but also suggesting that removal 
based on substantive decisions was improper); Barnett, supra note 117, at 1397–98 n.231. 
Perhaps an ALJ is charged with being impartial and thus cannot be insubordinate for failing to 
defer to the agency’s wishes. But even so, the vague good cause standard provides the agency 
much discretion in finding other more palatable, if insincere, grounds for removal.  
 337.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (MSPB members); 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) (2006) (similar 
standard for judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) 
(2006) (similar standard for tax-court judges); 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006) (similar standard for 
bankruptcy judges); 28 U.S.C. § 631 (similar standard for magistrate judges). 
 338.  See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82 (arguing that “good faith” standard is more 
open-ended than other removal standards and thus provides the removing party more discretion 
to decide appropriate grounds for removal); see also Timony, supra note 2, at 821 (referring to 
judicial interpretation of good cause as “broad and expanding”). 
 339.  See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82. 
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compared to other ALJs).340 Whatever minimal supervisory power the 
agency loses under the proposed removal standard as a practical 
matter, the proposed standard mitigates impartiality concerns that 
could arise under a broad reading of good cause,341 provides more 
specific grounds for removal,342 treats ALJs like other federal 
adjudicators (both those within and without Article III), and makes 
clear that agencies may seek removal based on an ALJ’s unjustified 
inability to control his or her docket (i.e., inefficiency).343 
The complete transfer of removal power from the executive to 
the judicial branch may give one pause. After all, the Supreme Court 
in Morrison was not only troubled by the Special Division’s limited 
ability to terminate the independent counsel, but the Court also relied 
upon the Attorney General’s limited ability to remove the independent 
counsel when upholding the interbranch appointment of the 
independent counsel.344 And perhaps the executive branch’s need for 
the removal power is at its apex when the executive branch does not 
appoint the officer in question. Under the proposal here, the executive 
branch’s removal power is fully removed, and the judiciary has a more 
robust removal power than in Morrison. 
But, in the ALJ context, the problems themselves provide the 
solutions. As previously discussed, an interbranch-appointment-and-
removal power cures the supervision and impartiality concerns in a 
manner that executive-branch removal would flout. In other contexts, 
the concerns that Congress sought to address did not require the 
transfer of the removal power. For instance, the interbranch 
appointment of the independent counsel mitigated an intrabranch 
 
 340.  See generally Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving, in an ambiguous 
opinion, controversial productivity initiative for ALJs within the SSA). Professor Richard Pierce 
has opined that the productivity standard became toothless based on MSPB decisions and 
reconsideration within the SSA. See Richard Pierce, What Should We Do About Administrative 
Law Judge Decisionmaking? 15–16 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 573, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890770.  
 341.  See Timony, supra note 2, at 822 (“Such broad and amorphous standards may impinge 
on judicial independence . . . .”). 
 342.  See id. at 824 (advocating use of clearer removal standard). 
 343.  See id. at 826–28 (discussing removal based on low productivity). 
 344.  See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988); id. at 692 (“This is not a case in 
which the power to remove an executive official has been completely stripped from the President, 
thus providing no means for the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”); id. at 
695–96 (discussing the ways in which the Attorney General could supervise the Independent 
Counsel, including limited, “for cause” removal power). Moreover, the majority in Free Enterprise 
Fund suggested that the President’s removal power was central to the President’s supervisory 
power. See Krent, supra note 282, at 2426, 2437 (“But, to the majority, the removal authority 
was talismanic . . . .”). 
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conflict of interest in having someone appointed to investigate the 
executive branch itself, and the interbranch appointment of U.S. 
Attorneys provides a last-ditch solution to ensure prosecutorial 
continuity while the elected branches fight over a successor. But with 
ALJs, the transfer of the removal power is part of the solution. 
This problem-as-solution rationale would likely be insufficient 
to justify the transfer of the removal power if it were not also for ALJs’ 
unique role within the executive branch. As previously mentioned, the 
underlying rationale of Free Enterprise Fund’s focus on the removal 
power was that the President should not be required to persuade 
executive officers. But ALJs exist to be persuaded. The executive 
branch does not need the power to remove ALJs, as opposed to other 
executive inferior officials who could make policy decisions, to protect 
its political prerogative. In short, the removal power is not always a 
necessary means of supervision. Moreover, the President’s ability to 
overturn ALJ decisions and seek an ALJ’s removal quickly permits 
him or her to have sufficient supervisory power to ensure the central 
functioning of the executive branch. Indeed, the lack of executive-
branch removal power gives ALJs and the administrative bureaucracy 
within the executive branch an increased perception of impartiality 
and thus more public legitimacy. The removal power’s “talismanic” 
quality345 loses its mythical force in a purely adjudicatory context, 
where other methods of supervision can and should suffice. The 
executive branch, in other words, may completely lose the power to 
remove ALJs, but it still has significant methods of supervising and 
directing them.346 
Finally, because the President should be deemed to have 
sufficient supervisory power over ALJs, the D.C. Circuit’s power to 
remove them should not transform ALJs into inferior Article III 
officers. Under my proposal, the executive branch and the D.C. 
Circuit, to be sure, share oversight of ALJs—the former through 
supervision of policy and the latter through its limited removal power. 
But ALJs, as between the executive and judicial branches, fit better 
within the executive branch because they help formulate executive 
 
 345.  See Krent, supra note 282, at 2437; see also supra note 289 (referring to scholarship 
arguing that courts should focus on other indicia of administrative independence and executive 
control). 
 346.  To be sure, the Supreme Court may take a more formal view of supervision by 
requiring, as the form of supervision, that the President have the power to remove subordinates. 
If so, my proposal would likely impede the President’s supervisory powers, and the quandary 
would remain unresolved. A more functional understanding of supervision is likely necessary, 
and not inconsistent with current precedent, to resolve the quandary surrounding ALJs. 
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policy through their initial decisions, and the executive branch can 
control that policy by reversing those decisions. The judiciary’s 
oversight is limited to removing ALJs for narrow causes upon others’ 
requests, including that of the executive branch. Indeed, as the Article 
III courts’ removal power over bankruptcy judges suggests,347 the 
judiciary’s power to remove an officer should not, by itself, render that 
officer as one within Article III. In short, the D.C. Circuit’s limited 
removal power as a form of ALJ oversight does not, without more, 
render ALJs Article III officers, in light of ALJs’ function and greater 
oversight from the executive branch. 
As the Court recognized in Mistretta when quoting James 
Madison: 
‘Separation of powers . . . ‘d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have 
no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but rather ‘that where 
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the 
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, 
are subverted.’348 
Vesting the power to appoint and remove ALJs in an Article III court 
falls far short of vesting the whole executive power in the judiciary 
because the judiciary has no policymaking power whatsoever. The 
executive branch has the ability to make policy at every turn and 
continue “to take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed.”349 Here, 
as elsewhere, “constitutional principles of separated powers are not 
violated . . . by mere anomaly or innovation.”350 
 
 347.  See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2619 
(holding that bankruptcy courts are not adjuncts of Article III courts). 
 348.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–81 (1989) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
47, at 325–26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in original)). Indeed, even Justice 
Scalia may agree in the context of an interbranch appointment. The lone dissenter in Mistretta 
(and Morrison), Justice Scalia chided the majority for citing Madison for the point that the 
boundaries between the three branches were porous. He argued instead that  
[Madison’s] point was that the commingling specifically provided for in the structure 
that he and his colleagues had designed—the Presidential veto over legislation, the 
Senate’s confirmation of executive and judicial officers, the Senate’s ratification of 
treaties, the Congress’s power to impeach and remove executive and judicial officers—
did not violate a proper understanding of separation of powers. 
Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The text of the Appointments Clause permits such 
“commingling” through interbranch appointments and thus may be acceptable even to Justice 
Scalia. 
 349.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 350.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385 (majority opinion). But see Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. 
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) (stating that lack of historical pedigree can indicate 
constitutional infirmity); accord Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
An interbranch appointment of ALJs is overdue. Five current 
Supreme Court Justices (two of whom are eminent administrative law 
scholars) have suggested that certain ALJs are not appointed 
properly. Four Justices have suggested that ALJs’ tiered-tenure 
protections may be invalidated in future litigation. And ALJ 
impartiality is a continued topic of discomfort for scholars, litigants, 
and ALJs. Because of administrative uncertainty and distraction 
arising from the mere presence of those issues, Congress should not 
await judicial resolution of these troubling issues. Indeed, Congress 
has remedied past separation-of-powers problems without waiting for 
a definitive answer.351 Moreover, even if ALJs are not constitutionally 
infirm, they are not necessarily in excellent health. An interbranch 
appointment, along with relatively minor statutory changes to the 
ALJ appointment and removal scheme, can both mitigate potential 
constitutional questions and ameliorate the current concerns about 
ALJ impartiality. 
Key constituencies, such as federal agencies, have good reasons 
to support my proposal. For instance, despite losing the ability to 
select ALJs under my proposal, agencies would gain a way around the 
Rule of Three by obtaining the ability to nominate their own 
candidates if they are unsatisfied with the three original candidates. 
Because it is likely that the D.C. Circuit, in interests of comity, will 
carefully consider the agencies’ views and proffered candidates, the 
agencies may actually prefer to exchange the power to select for the 
power to nominate. The agencies would also retain the power to seek 
removal of ALJs. Under either the current or proposed scheme, they 
must convince an independent body to remove ALJs. And, to mollify 
their expressed concerns over the protracted nature of ALJ-removal 
proceedings, agencies would receive swifter resolution of ALJ-removal 
proceedings because of the direct filing of an action with the D.C. 
Circuit.352 
 
 351.  After Professor John Duffy noted that the appointment of certain administrative judges 
for the Board of Patent Appeals was very likely unconstitutional, Congress altered those judges’ 
mode of appointment without awaiting a judicial determination concerning those appointments. 
See John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
904, 904 n.*, 918 n.72 (2009) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (as amended Aug. 2008)). 
 352.  Given agencies’ reduced control over ALJs, as compared to other agency employees, 
agencies have turned to rulemaking and non-ALJ hearing officers when possible. See Wertkin, 
supra note 288, at 397–99, n.157 (citing Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for 
Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70 (1996) (stating that non-ALJs are “sprouting 
faster than tulips in Holland”)). Because agencies are in essentially the same, if not an improved, 
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Likewise, ALJs should support an interbranch-appointment 
solution. Despite failing to obtain Article III protections and status, 
they do receive clarified tenure protection that is suited to their 
adjudicative function, and they obtain more perceived and actual 
indicia of independence. An independent branch’s appointment and 
removal of ALJs should help balance the ALJs’ pro-agency bias that is 
said to develop and help link the administrative adjudicators with 
their deified judicial counterparts. No longer will a party to formal 
agency proceedings be the appointing and removing power. 
Even the D.C. Circuit judges have reason to support the 
interbranch-appointment proposal. The D.C. Circuit has not been fully 
staffed in more than a decade, in part because of the general 
perception that the court is not sufficiently busy to require the number 
of active judges that the court is permitted to have353 and because of 
the politicization of appointments to the “second most important 
court” in the country, from which several recent Supreme Court 
Justices have been elevated.354 Vesting the appointment and removal 
power in the D.C. Circuit may mitigate both concerns. Proponents of 
having a full complement of D.C. Circuit judges could point to the 
court’s increased duties to compensate for its low number of decisions. 
And they could point to the court’s administrative role in protecting 
formal executive adjudication—by selecting neutral adjudicators355—
as a means of emphasizing the court’s important and necessary place 
in the judiciary and the administrative state, and de-emphasizing the 
court’s unofficial status as a junior-varsity Supreme Court. 
More broadly, my proposal demonstrates the potential for 
interbranch appointments to solve structural concerns with the 
modern administrative state. The clarified and simplified incongruity 
analysis that I have proposed is consistent with interbranch-
appointment jurisprudence and perhaps may render interbranch 
appointment a helpful tool for Congress to remedy as-of-yet 
unidentified, future separation-of-powers conundrums. Congress, 
thereby, can improve the fairness, both actual and perceived, in the 
governing structures that it creates. 
 
position under my proposal as they are currently, an interbranch appointment will likely not 
alter the agencies’ turning away from ALJs. The issue, instead, concerns when Congress should 
require formal adjudication under the APA. 
 353.  See Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 223, at 562 n.63 (discussing Congress’s questioning 
of whether the D.C. Circuit was sufficiently busy to require twelve judges).  
 354.  Carl Tobias, The Urgent Need to Fill The Current D.C. Circuit Vacancies, JUSTICA.COM 
(Nov. 14, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/11/14/the-urgent-need-to-fill-the-current-d-c-
circuit-vacancies. 
 355.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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*** 
In closing, one final series of questions emerges: Should 
scholars, including me, bother considering solutions for these mostly 
formalist problems, largely arising from questionable Supreme Court 
precedent? For instance, does it really matter, as a functional matter, 
who appoints ALJs, when these ALJs may have lunch or chat around 
the water cooler with other employees within the agency, or when the 
agency can generally overrule all ALJ decisions anyway? Or, for 
example, should we concern ourselves with a removal-power doctrine 
that appears to invalidate tiered-tenure protection although one tier of 
tenure protection can substantially limit the President’s control over 
the administrative state? Similarly, should we worry about 
independence and impartiality issues that are largely grounded on 
appearances of impropriety and perhaps merely theoretical effects of 
an agency’s appointment and initiation of removal? Indeed, should we 
address the Court’s current formalist separation-of-powers doctrines 
at all in light of its historical fluctuation between formalism and 
functionalism? 
In short, the answer to these questions—all of which, at 
bottom, ask whether current doctrine that largely eschews 
functionalism for formalism should matter to normative reforms—is 
yes. Separation-of-powers scholars often seek to reshape or reconsider 
separation of powers.356 Although such work has its place, the purpose 
of this Article is to move beyond the mere normative issues and 
instead define the problems and answers within the doctrinal 
construct that the Court has provided. Doctrine, for better or worse, 
matters for practicing lawyers and judges, and I seek to persuade 
scholars, practitioners, and Congress that my statutory solution is a 
serious option to consider in resolving a multifaceted problem. 
Formalities can often matter both substantively and 
practically. For instance, the Court has repeatedly held that the 
vesting of the appointment power is not mere “etiquette or protocol.”357 
Instead, the appointing formalities are express, specific requirements 
in the Constitution meant to act as a bulwark for democratic 
government.358 But formalism, as with the Court’s removal-powers 
jurisprudence can potentially have significant, disruptive effects on 
 
 356.  See Barkow, supra note 289, at 16 n.2 (referring to the “vast literature” on separation of 
powers and agency independence). 
 357.  See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 358.  Id. 
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the federal administrative state.359 The proposed solution here 
respects the substantive underpinnings, as well as limits the 
disruptive effects, of the Court’s formalist doctrines. 
Whether one supports or disfavors the Court’s formalism 
normatively, one cannot simply ignore the doctrine or wish for its 
demise. The Court has taken a decidedly formalist turn in its 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence for nearly twenty-five years. For 
instance, the Court has relied upon a more formal definition of 
“inferior officer,”360 settled upon a new two-part definition of 
“department,”361 eschewed a functional understanding of the 
President’s removal powers that four dissenting Justices would have 
adopted,362 and likely returned to more formal limits on removing 
disputes from Article III courts.363 In light of these decisions and the 
lack of functional counterexamples since 1988’s Morrison v. Olson, the 
Court’s formal doctrines are not a mere fad, but instead a conscious 
jurisprudential turn that scholars ignore at their peril. These formal 
doctrines create, in part, the tripartite quandary that I discuss here, 
and a solution becomes difficult because functional concerns lose much 
of their salience. One must, therefore, confront the doctrine on its own 
terms, seek a formal solution to a largely formal problem, and—in the 
process—seek to suggest ways to soften the edges or unintended 
consequences of the formalist doctrine with permissible functional 
considerations. Here, I have proposed a formal interbranch-
appointment-and-removal mechanism that seeks to address the 
formal problems of executive adjudication and account for some 
functional avenues where the Court’s decisions permit. 
Finally, statutory proposals, such as the one that I have 
proposed here that seeks to dull the edges of the Court’s formalism, 
reduce the real possibility of the Court creating even more uncertainty 
in the law to account for the problems that its formal doctrines create. 
The Court’s separation-of-powers doctrines are notoriously hard to 
reconcile, often lacking any theoretical consistency.364 The Court may 
be tempted to decide cases in ways that avoid disruptive outcomes at 
the expense of whatever doctrinal coherence exists. My statutory 
 
 359.  See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3177–82 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the potential consequences of the Court’s ruling on the double for-cause 
removal clause at issue). 
 360.  See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997). 
 361.  See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163. 
 362.  See id. at 3167–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 363.  See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09, 2620 (2011). 
 364.  See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1350. 
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solution is meant to avoid such decisions. Perhaps paradoxically, the 
Court’s formal, inconsistent doctrines may have ultimately provided 
an impetus for solving both formal and functional problems that have 
long plagued formal administrative adjudication. And this solution 
may, as a consequence, give ALJs some of the deification that they 
have long craved. 
